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Disgorging Harvey Weinstein’s 
Salary 
Jessica Fink† 
Harvey Weinstein dramatically altered the way that people view sexual 
harassment in the workplace. Workplace sexual harassment is far from a new 
phenomenon—with many perpetrators of such harassment (including Weinstein 
himself) having gotten away with this misbehavior for decades. Yet the exposure 
of Weinstein’s misdeeds opened the floodgates, leading countless women from a 
variety of work environments to share their own experiences with sexual 
harassment at work. As the #MeToo movement has continued to occupy the 
headlines, workplace harassment has begun to seem as ubiquitous as it is 
distressing. 
This intensified spotlight on sexual harassment has exposed a persistent 
frustration among academics, the media, and members of the public, as society 
puzzles over what can be done to eliminate sexual misbehavior at work. Robust 
research indicates that conventional mechanisms for addressing sexual 
harassment, like carefully worded policies or mandatory training sessions, fail 
to root out perpetrators like Weinstein. Instead, research demonstrates that only 
significant cultural change in the workplace can reduce instances of sexual 
misconduct. This Article explores a new—and potentially radical—way of 
instilling such cultural change. 
This Article describes a little known but powerful remedies principle known 
as the faithless servant doctrine, which allows for the disgorgement of 
compensation from employees who breach their fiduciary duties to their 
employers. When employees breach their fiduciary duties by creating or 
perpetuating a culture of workplace harassment, the faithless servant doctrine 
could provide companies with a powerful tool to demonstrate that this sexual 
misconduct negates any value that a misbehaving employee otherwise brings to 
the workplace. This article questions whether using compensation disgorgement 
 
   DOI: https://doi.org/10.15779/Z38SB3X01M 
 †.  Clara Shortridge Foltz Professor of Law, California Western School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law 
School, 2001; B.A., University of Michigan, 1997. I am grateful to my colleagues at California Western 
School of Law for their input regarding this project in its earliest stages, and specifically thank Professor 
Daniel Yeager for his insights and suggestions throughout this process. Thanks also to Lindsey Cherpes 
for her excellent and thorough research assistance. 
286 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 41:2 
to hit wrongdoers where it hurts—in their wallets—finally could foster the 
cultural shift that is necessary to decrease sexual harassment at work. 
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In the fall of 2017, the world watched in shock, awe, dismay, and 
vindication as famed producer and movie mogul Harvey Weinstein faced an 
onslaught of allegations detailing decades of sexual and other misconduct toward 
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dozens of women.1 Combined with the astonishment and concern, however, was 
a sense of resignation: Weinstein’s misbehavior had been an open secret in 
Hollywood for years, seen yet largely ignored by dozen—if not hundreds—of 
individuals both inside and outside of the entertainment industry.2 Women had 
warned each other behind the scenes to avoid vulnerable interactions with the 
producer;3 media outlets had been persuaded to suppress stories of Weinstein’s 
indiscretions.4 Allegations regarding Weinstein’s sexual misconduct even found 
their way into the opening monologue of the 2013 Academy Awards.5 Yet 
despite the swirls of allegations against him, Weinstein for years operated almost 
completely unchecked.6 
In many ways, the eventual public airing of the charges against Weinstein 
opened the floodgates for countless women to come forward, not only 
corroborating stories of Weinstein’s misdeeds, but also alleging similar 
misbehavior by scores of other men, some well-known and some not.7 From 
radio hosts to college professors to businesspeople, men across various industries 
found themselves accused of a broad range of sexual misbehavior in the 
workplace.8 Women turned to social media to express their collective outrage, 
 
 1.   See Ronan Farrow, From Aggressive Overtures to Sexual Assault: Harvey Weinstein’s 
Accusers Tell Their Stories, NEW YORKER (Oct. 23, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-
desk/from-aggressive-overtures-to-sexual-assault-harvey-weinsteins-accusers-tell-their-stories 
[https://perma.cc/HMU7-B49Z]; Jodi Kantor & Megan Twohey, Harvey Weinstein Paid Off Sexual 
Harassment Accusers for Decades, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/us/harvey-weinstein-harassment-allegations.html 
[https://perma.cc/E5T7-HSCD]. 
 2.  See Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1. 
 3.  Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (relating one woman’s advice to a peer that she “wear a parka 
when summoned for duty [by Weinstein] as a layer of protection against unwelcome advances”). 
 4.  See Farrow, supra note 1. 
 5.  See Libby Hill, Seth MacFarlane Reveals Truth About His 2013 Harvey Weinstein Joke, L.A. 
TIMES (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/entertainment/la-et-entertainment-news-updates-seth-
macfarlane-reveals-truth-about-his-1507755303-htmlstory.html [https://perma.cc/J98J-HPRB] 
(describing host Seth MacFarlane’s quip regarding nominees for best supporting actress: 
“Congratulations . . . [y]ou five ladies no longer have to pretend to be attracted to Harvey Weinstein”). 
MacFarlane’s joke received a “considerable response from the room,” id., including “relatively raucous 
laughter.” Maya Oppenheim, Seth MacFarlane Made Joke About Harvey Weinstein and Women at 2013 
Oscars, INDEPENDENT (Oct. 11, 2017), https://www.independent.co.uk/arts-
entertainment/films/news/seth-macfarlane-harvey-weinstein-joke-oscars-2013-women-sexual-
harassment-allegations-a7994506.html [https://perma.cc/7WY2-WNGX]. MacFarlane has since 
explained that he made the joke approximately two years after a female friend and colleague confided in 
him regarding an inappropriate sexual advance that she received from Weinstein. See id. 
 6.  See Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1. 
 7.  Cf. Maria LaMagna, Why Sexual Harassers Keep Offending, MARKETWATCH (Dec. 28, 2017), 
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/one-major-reason-why-sexual-harassers-can-continue-2017-10-21 
[https://perma.cc/B5PK-N6BR] (hereinafter “LaMagna I”) (“[T]he social media campaign #metoo 
suggests hundreds of thousands, or even millions of women have experienced harassment in the 
workplace.”). 
 8.  See id.; Rhitu Chatterjee, A New Survey Finds 81 Percent of Women Have Experienced Sexual 
Harassment, NPR (Feb. 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2018/02/21/587671849/a-
new-survey-finds-eighty-percent-of-women-have-experienced-sexual-harassment 
[https://perma.cc/R5BJ-2Y55]. 
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with millions of people engaging with the #MeToo movement, further exposing 
the breadth of this problem across society.9 
Amidst the outrage and disbelief, however, another reaction has emerged—
a sort of desperate handwringing, as academics and members of the media and 
the public brood about what can be done to prevent this type of misconduct from 
continuing to occur.10 Even the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
(EEOC), a purported expert on fostering fair and unbiased workplace relations, 
has expressed befuddlement regarding this issue. In June 2016, months prior to 
Harvey Weinstein and #MeToo occupying the headlines, the EEOC’s Select 
Task Force on the Study of Harassment in the Workplace issued a lengthy 
report.11 In the report, the authors wondered, “[w]ith legal liability long ago 
established, with reputational harm from harassment well known, with an entire 
cottage industry of workplace compliance and training adopted and encouraged 
for 30 years, why does so much harassment . . . take place in so many of our 
workplaces . . . [and] what can be done to prevent it?”12 
This article presents one possible answer to that question. Using 
longstanding principles of remedies law, this paper considers whether applying 
a little known but powerful doctrine known as the faithless servant doctrine to 
perpetrators of workplace sexual harassment could provide substantial 
deterrence. 
The faithless servant doctrine permits the disgorgement or forfeiture of 
compensation from individuals who have breached their duty of loyalty.13 The 
doctrine is restitutionary in nature, meaning that it focuses on a wrongdoer’s 
 
 9.  Cassandra Santiago & Doug Criss, An Activist, a Little Girl and the Heartbreaking Origin of 
‘MeToo’, CNN (Oct. 17, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/10/17/us/me-too-tarana-burke-origin-
trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/8QH8-UW92] (citing Facebook’s assertion that in less than 24 hours 
following the announcement of the hashtag, 4.7 million people around the world engaged in the “Me too” 
conversation, with more than 12 million posts, comments and reactions). 
 10.  See, e.g., Sexual Harassment Training is Largely Ineffective, PSYCHOL. TODAY (Dec. 13, 
2017), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/evidence-based-living/201712/sexual-harassment-
training-is-largely-ineffective [https://perma.cc/G3TQ-D4EV]; see also Claire Cain Miller, Sexual 
Harassment Training Doesn’t Work. But Some Things Do, N.Y TIMES (Dec. 11. 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/11/upshot/sexual-harassment-workplace-prevention-effective.html 
[https://perma.cc/J5YE-X9A5]; Roger Showley, Sexual Harassment Training Expanded – But 
Effectiveness Questioned, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIBUNE (Feb. 12, 2018), 
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/growth-development/sd-fi-sextraining-20180212-
story.html [https://perma.cc/3FLQ-6VU6]. 
 11.  CHAI R. FELDBLUM & VICTORIA A. LIPNIC, EEOC, SELECT TASK FORCE ON THE STUDY OF 
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE (2016), https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/task_force/harassment/report.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/KE33-QBFJ] (hereinafter “EEOC Task Force Report”). 
 12.  Id. at ii. Notably, the EEOC Task Force Report covered a broader range of harassment than is 
the focus of this paper, including not only sexual harassment, but also harassment on the basis of race, 
disability, age, ethnicity, color, and religion. See id at iv. 
 13.  Barbara J. Van Arsdale, Annotation, Application of “Faithless Servant Doctrine,” 24 A.L.R. 
6th 399 (originally published in 2007) (describing faithless servant doctrine as providing that “an agent is 
entitled to no compensation for conduct which . . . is a breach of his or her duty of loyalty”). 
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unjust gain rather than on a victim’s loss.14 While the contours of the faithless 
servant doctrine can vary significantly from one jurisdiction to the next,15 and 
while even the doctrine’s name may differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,16 the 
underlying notion of using compensation forfeiture to respond to employees’ 
wrongful conduct remains a theme for courts that apply these restitutionary 
principles.17 
Using Harvey Weinstein and his misdeeds as a case study, this article 
explores the extent to which conventional models for preventing workplace 
sexual harassment have remained largely ineffective. The article further 
examines whether a dramatic shift in how businesses and courts approach this 
problem—a shift like that which would be embodied by the faithless servant 
doctrine and other compensation forfeiture tools—could create the significant 
cultural change necessary to decrease this misbehavior. This article largely 
represents a thought experiment—a wondering about how society, seemingly 
mired in rehashing the same, marginally effective “solutions” to the problem of 
sexual harassment at work, might perhaps begin to think about harassment 
prevention in another way. While by no means a perfect fit for Weinstein’s 
situation, and while perhaps a stretch of restitutionary doctrine more generally, 
this paper is intended to provide a fundamentally different way of thinking about 
this longstanding problem within the workplace. 
Part I of this article provides a brief overview of the Weinstein scandal as 
an example of the sexual misconduct that has plagued many modern workplaces. 
Part II explains why existing means of addressing sexual harassment have proven 
ineffective, and argues that changes in the broader workplace culture are required 
to reduce instances of this misconduct at work. Part III, finally, explains why the 
faithless servant doctrine and similar compensation forfeiture mechanisms could 
in some contexts create the type of cultural shift necessary to decrease sexual 
harassment at work.18 Part III further explores the complications in applying 
 
 14.  See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 4.1(1) (2d ed., West Pub. Co. 1993) (describing 
restitution as “a return or restoration of what the defendant gained in a transaction”). 
 15.  See infra § III.B.2 and accompanying text. 
 16.  See infra note 148 and accompanying text. 
 17.  While the technical definitions of “compensation forfeiture” and “compensation disgorgement” 
may differ somewhat, see, e.g., Forfeiture, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (Bryan A. Garner, ed. 11th ed. 
2019) (defining “forfeiture” as, inter alia, “[t]he divestiture of property without compensation” or as “[t]he 
loss of a right, privilege, or property because of a crime, breach of obligation, or neglect of duty. . .”); cf. 
id. (defining “disgorgement” as “[t]he act of giving something up (such as profits illegally obtained) on 
demand or by legal compulsion”), this paper uses these terms interchangeably, generally referring to 
situations where a court mandates that a high level employee return the compensation that he/she received 
during a period in which that individual also engaged in misconduct related to their job. 
 18.  This paper refers to “sexual misconduct,” “sexual misbehavior,” and “sexual harassment,” often 
using these terms (and other similar terms) somewhat interchangeably. While much of the conduct 
described in this paper would rise to the level of legally actionable sexual harassment, see Burlington 
Indus. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 752 (1998) (defining quid pro quo and hostile environment sexual 
harassment), and/or criminally actionable sexual assault, see, e.g., CA Penal Code § 243.4, even sexual 
misconduct that does not trigger civil or criminal liability can create an undesirable working environment 
for those targeted by such behavior. While this paper lumps much of this behavior together, it by no means 
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these forfeiture ideas to situations like that involving Harvey Weinstein, where 
the harasser’s employer (here, the Weinstein Company) may have recklessly 
ignored or even been complicit in the underlying wrongful conduct. 
I. HARVEY WEINSTEIN AS A CASE STUDY FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT GONE 
UNCHECKED 
For many years, Harvey Weinstein’s name seemed synonymous with movie 
gold. As the co-founder of the production and distribution companies Miramax 
and the Weinstein Company,19 Weinstein helped to create such movie 
masterpieces and cult classics as “Pulp Fiction,” “The English Patient,” “The 
Crying Game,” and countless others.20 The Weinstein Company’s films have 
grossed an estimated $1.3 billion worldwide,21 garnering 303 Oscar nominations 
and 75 Academy Awards.22 Prior to the scandal breaking, in 2016, Weinstein 
told the Hollywood Reporter that his studio was worth between $700 million and 
$800 million, “in a worst case scenario.”23 Also prior to his public downfall, 
Weinstein’s personal wealth was estimated to fall somewhere between $240 
million and $300 million.24 Weinstein achieved such financial success all while 
being well known within Hollywood for his explosive temper and mercurial 
nature,25 and was able to amass tremendous power within the industry—whether 
in spite of or because of his volatile temperament.26 Indeed, Weinstein’s sway 
within the entertainment industry before his fall was virtually undisputed. As one 
reporter observed, “at the annual awards ceremonies, [Weinstein] has been 
thanked more than almost anyone else in movie history, ranking just after Steven 
Spielberg and right before God.”27 
 
suggests a “one size fits all” solution for this broad range of objectionable conduct. Rather, this paper 
posits that the Faithless Servant Doctrine and similar disgorgement strategies could be applied to a broad 
range of sexual misbehavior to deter this type of workplace conduct, while still recognizing that different 
degrees of misconduct might warrant slightly different responses. Cf. EEOC Task Force Report, supra 
note 11, at iv (noting that the Report’s authors “did not confine ourselves to the legal definition of 
workplace harassment, but rather included examination of conduct and behaviors which might not be 
‘legally actionable,’ but left unchecked, may set the stage for unlawful harassment”); see also id. at 3. 
 19.  See Farrow, supra note 1. 
 20.  See id. 
 21.  See Natalie Robehmed, Why the Weinsteins Aren’t Among Hollywood’s Richest Power Brokers, 
FORBES (Aug. 19, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/natalierobehmed/2015/08/19/why-the-weinsteins-
arent-among-hollywoods-richest-power-brokers/#6d8c1101a3f7 [https://perma.cc/YS8L-ALWL]. 
 22.  See id.; Farrow, supra note 1. 
 23.  Gregg Kilday, Harvey Weinstein Explains Recent Movie Release Shifts, TV Growth and Oscar 
Prospects (Q&A), HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (July 21, 2016), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/harvey-weinstein-explains-movie-release-913142 
[https://perma.cc/8AUN-MGAD]. 
 24.  Brad Tuttle, Harvey Weinstein is One of the Richest Men in Hollywood. Here’s What We Know 
About his Money, MONEY (Oct. 12, 2017), http://money.com/money/4978630/harvey-weinstein-net-
worth-money/ [https://perma.cc/EB6C-ZX7K]. 
 25.  See Farrow, supra note 1. 
 26.  See id. 
 27.  Id. 
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It is within the context of such tremendous power that Weinstein faced an 
onslaught of harassment allegations in fall of 2017.28 Perhaps equally shocking 
are the scope, scale, and extreme nature of the allegations against Harvey 
Weinstein. As has now become common knowledge, Weinstein has been 
accused of sexual misconduct by more than 100 women,29 with allegations that 
span back for more than three decades, during Weinstein’s time heading the 
Weinstein Company as well as during his previous tenure at the helm of 
Miramax.30 His alleged victims include some of the most prominent names in the 
entertainment industry, from Gwyneth Paltrow to Rosanna Arquette to Angelina 
Jolie, as well as scores of other lesser-known actresses.31 Weinstein often would 
begin by attempting to lure women into private rooms, requesting a massage or 
asking them to watch him bathe, but the allegations against him also include 
multiple counts of forced sexual contact, claims that Weinstein exposed himself 
or masturbated in front of unwilling women, as well as at least four allegations 
of sexual assault or rape.32 According to some accounts, female Weinstein 
employees were “used as ‘honeypots’ to lure victims into meetings under the 
pretense of normal business,”33 only for Weinstein to later dismiss them, leaving 
him alone with his intended targets.34 Moreover, as a buffer against the exposure 
of his misdeeds, Weinstein mandated that all employees adhere to a strict code 
of silence, under which employees were prohibited from criticizing the 
Weinstein Company or its leaders in any way that could harm the company’s or 
its leaders’ reputations.35 
 
 28.  See id. 
 29.  See Amelia Schonbeck, The Complete List of Allegations Against Harvey Weinstein, THE CUT 
(Jan. 6, 2020), https://www.thecut.com/2020/01/harvey-weinstein-complete-list-allegations.html 
[https://perma.cc/B9XY-8LT9]; Sara M. Moniuszko & Cara Kelly, Harvey Weinstein Scandal: A 
Complete List of the 87 Accusers, USA TODAY (Oct. 27, 2017), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/people/2017/10/27/weinstein-scandal-complete-list-
accusers/804663001/ [https://perma.cc/G7MT-6LFU]. 
 30.  See Kanyakrit Vongkiatkajorn, Harvey Weinstein Made an Absolute Fortune Off Movies 
Featuring his Alleged Victims, MOTHER JONES (Oct. 11, 2017), 
https://www.motherjones.com/media/2017/10/harvey-weinstein-made-an-absolute-fortune-off-movies-
featuring-his-alleged-victims/ [https://perma.cc/A4WG-BF8H]. 
 31.  See id. 
 32.  See id.; Farrow, supra note 1; Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, It May Not Matter What the 
Weinstein Company Knew, ATLANTIC (Oct. 14, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/10/harvey-weinstein-company-legal-
consequences/542838/ [https://perma.cc/4SGC-G2E8] (hereinafter “Hemel & Lund I”). 
 33.  Ryan Faughnder, Victoria Kim & Stephen Battaglio, As Harvey Weinstein Sex Scandal Grows, 
One Accuser Says His Company was Negligent, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2017), 
https://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-fi-ct-harvey-weinstein-huett-20171025-story.html 
[https://perma.cc/C36R-L927]. 
 34.  Id. 
 35.  Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1. 
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In addition to the individual consequences Weinstein faces—including both 
criminal charges36 and civil lawsuits,37—the Weinstein Company and its Board 
of Directors may also be liable for their alleged complicity in Weinstein’s 
schemes. Indeed, as discussed in greater detail below, the Weinstein Company’s 
Board of Directors at best seemed to turn a blind eye to Weinstein’s misconduct, 
adopting an almost willful refusal to acknowledge behavior that was common 
knowledge across the majority of the entertainment industry.38 At worst, the 
Weinstein Company was actively cooperating with the harassment: The 
Weinstein Company repeatedly declined to investigate Weinstein in the face of 
harassment allegations, while quietly settling claims with women who accused 
Weinstein of misconduct, and while continuing to renew Weinstein’s lucrative 
employment contract.39 This failure to investigate and subsequent cover-up 
demonstrates an apparent willingness to give Weinstein broad discretion to abuse 
scores of women over three decades so long as the Oscars and profits continued 
to pile up. Such apparent complicity led at least one alleged target of Weinstein’s 
misconduct, actress Dominique Huett, to file a negligence suit against the 
Weinstein Company, claiming that the company knew about Weinstein’s alleged 
misconduct and failed to protect the women with whom Weinstein came into 
contact.40 Weinstein, Miramax, and the Weinstein Company also previously 
 
 36.  See Jessica M. Goldstein, From Racketeering Claims to Rape Charges, a Guide to All the Cases 
Against Harvey Weinstein, THINKPROGESS.ORG (Oct. 25, 2018), https://thinkprogress.org/the-many-
many-cases-against-harvey-weinstein-a-complete-guide-d14a1d99a0cd/ [https://perma.cc/229U-LXS4]; 
Eric Levenson & Elizabeth Joseph, Harvey Weinstein Judge Declines to Dismiss Charges in Rape Case, 
Sets Pretrial Hearing for March, CNN (Dec. 20, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/20/us/harvey-
weinstein-court-charges/index.html [https://perma.cc/R8X3-KT7D] (reporting Weinstein faced at least 
five felony charges, including predatory sexual assault and rape, in connection with two women in two 
unrelated incidents); Jan Ransom and Jose A. Del Real, Harvey Weinstein Charged with Rape in Los 
Angeles as N.Y. Trial Starts, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/06/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-trial.html [https://perma.cc/2L4A-
H7MQ] (reporting that prosecutors in Los Angeles filed additional rape charges against Weinstein based 
on allegations involving two other women). In February of 2020, a New York jury found Weinstein guilty 
of first-degree criminal sexual act and third degree rape. Jan Ransom, Harvey Weinstein’s Stunning 
Downfall: 23 Years in Prison, N.Y. TIMES (Published Mar.11, 2020, Updated Mar. 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/11/nyregion/harvey-weinstein-sentencing.html 
[https://perma.cc/2C7Q-H8NS]. Weinstein was sentenced to 23 years in prison. Id. 
 37.  Weinstein also faces multiple civil suits, either individually or as part of other litigation against 
his former company, see Goldstein, supra note 36; Dominic Patten, Harvey Weinstein Fails to Get Class 
Action Tossed; Bob Weinstein, Disney, TWC Board & David Glasser Dropped From Case, DEADLINE 
(Apr. 18, 2019), https://deadline.com/2019/04/harvey-weinstein-sexual-assault-lawsuit-class-action-
dismissal-failure-bob-weinstein-twc-1202598535/ [https://perma.cc/33GW-8GGN] (reporting civil suits 
against Weinstein in both the United States and the United Kingdom); Associated Press, Judge Allows 
Sex-Trafficking Claim in Suit Against Harvey Weinstein, HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Apr. 18, 2019), 
https://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/judge-allows-sex-trafficking-claim-suit-harvey-weinstein-
1203150 [https://perma.cc/99XV-QSPU]; Tom Connick, Harvey Weinstein Facing UK Civil Claim Over 
Sexual Assault Allegations, NEW MUSICAL EXPRESS (Nov. 27, 2017), 
https://www.nme.com/news/film/harvey-weinstein-facing-uk-civil-claim-sexual-assault-allegations-
2165809 [https://perma.cc/AR35-82BB]. 
 38.  See infra § III.D and accompanying text. 
 39.  See id. 
 40.  See Faughnder et al., supra note 33. 
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faced class action charges under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations (RICO) Act, among other claims,41 but those claims were 
dismissed as to the Weinstein Company (although not as to Harvey Weinstein 
himself) in April 2019.42 
Beyond any legal consequences, the financial toll on Weinstein and his 
former company is estimated at $390 to $490 million. While it is difficult to 
determine with certainty the company’s value prior to the scandal, previously-
noted estimates range from $700 million to $800 million. In the wake of the 
scandal, the Weinstein Company tried and failed to broker a deal with an investor 
group to purchase the company for $500 million.43 That deal collapsed after New 
York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman filed a civil rights lawsuit against the 
company.44 Ultimately, the Weinstein Company filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection in March 2018,45 and a private equity firm acquired the company’s 
assets for $289 million in July 2018.46 
The impact of the scandal on Weinstein’s personal fortune is more difficult 
to determine, but likely is less consequential. On the one hand, at the time the 
scandal broke, Weinstein held a more than 20% stake in the (soon-to-be defunct) 
Weinstein Company.47 As a major equity holder in the company, Weinstein’s 
equity was “expected to be wiped out” by the company’s bankruptcy 
proceedings.48 Moreover, Weinstein’s wife, Georgina Chapman, announced that 
she was leaving Weinstein in the wake of the scandal,49 and this divorce may 
prove financially costly to him as well. Yet despite these financial hits, 
Weinstein’s personal financial future seems far from bleak: Weinstein likely 
 
 41.  See The Weinstein Company and Others Face RICO Claim in Wake of Sexual Assault ‘Cover 
Ups,’ FORBES (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.forbes.com/sites/legalentertainment/2017/12/06/the-
weinstein-company-and-others-face-rico-claim-in-wake-of-sexual-assault-cover-ups/#7ed55f1d48fe 
[https://perma.cc/KQS3-LXP6] 
 42.  See Patten, supra note 37; Associated Press, supra note 37. 
 43.  See Anna Menta, What is The Weinstein Company Worth? Studio Declares Bankruptcy After 
$500 Million Deal Collapses, NEWSWEEK (Feb. 26, 2018, 1:51 PM), 
https://www.newsweek.com/weinstein-company-net-worth-declares-bankruptcy-820270 
[https://perma.cc/4L3M-5ZY8]; Chris Isidore, Remains of the Weinstein Company Sold—to the Only Real 
Bidder, CNN BUSINESS (May 2, 2018, 11:32 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/05/02/media/weinstein-
company-bidder/index.html [https://perma.cc/9Y8Q-U8DB]. 
 44.  See Elahe Izadi, The Weinstein Co. Declares Bankruptcy. Here’s What That Means and What 
Could Be Next, WASH. POST (Mar. 20, 2018, 10:03 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-
and-entertainment/wp/2018/03/20/the-weinstein-company-declares-bankruptcy-heres-what-that-means-
and-what-could-be-next/?utm_term=.3b7e456916b5 [https://perma.cc/8AZF-6TVZ]; Menta, supra note 
43. 
 45.  Izadi, supra note 44; see Menta, supra note 43. 
 46.  Dawn C. Chmielewski, Lantern Entertainment Closes $289 Million Acquisition of the 
Weinstein Co’s Assets, DEADLINE (July 18, 2018), https://deadline.com/2018/07/lantern-entertainment-
closes-289-million-acquisition-weinstein-co-s-assets-1202427141/ [https://perma.cc/W7U8-QQD6] 
 47.  See Josh Dickey, Want to be Sure You’re Not Paying Harvey Weinstein? There’s Only One 
Way, MASHABLE (Oct. 19, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/10/19/harvey-weinstein-make-money-
movies-films-dimension-co [https://perma.cc/9Y8Q-U8DB]. 
 48.  See Izadi, supra note 44 
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participated in hundreds of backend revenue deals related to his films,50 many of 
which are classic movies that not only earned money at the time of their release, 
but which have continued (and presumably will continue) to line Weinstein’s 
pockets every time they are enjoyed.51 Moreover, reports indicate that Weinstein 
reached a tentative settlement of the civil claims against him for $47 million, all 
of which apparently would be paid by the Weinstein Company’s insurance 
providers.52 While some accusers have elected not to join this settlement, and 
while criminal prosecutions against Weinstein remain ongoing despite this 
settlement, this resolution renders it quite possible that Weinstein can walk away 
from his wrongdoing with minimal direct personal financial impact.53 
II. MINIMIZING HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE AND BEYOND 
While much about the Weinstein scandal might seem shocking and unique, 
Weinstein’s conduct resembles the type of behavior that takes place in a variety 
of workplaces. The EEOC received 7,609 charges of sexual harassment in fiscal 
year 2018 alone,54 representing almost 10% of the 76,418 total charges filed with 
the agency that year.55 According to the EEOC, anywhere between 25% and 85% 
of women report experiencing sexual harassment at work, and this statistic does 
not include the many instances of sexual harassment which go unreported and 
even unidentified by the women targeted.56 The fact that in this case, such 
 
 50.  See Dickey, supra note 47. 
 51.  See Kelsea Stahler, Should We Watch the Hundreds of Films Produced by Harvey Weinstein? 
Female Film Critics Weigh In, BUSTLE (Oct. 12, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/should-we-watch-the-
hundreds-of-films-produced-by-harvey-weinstein-female-film-critics-weigh-in-2894326 
[https://perma.cc/4RVP-DH6V] (observing that “ignoring Weinstein’s impact on the landscape of film is 
impossible” and noting that he “executive produced over 100 films, so many of which are considered 
classics”); Dickey, supra note 47 (asserting that the only certain way to avoid putting money in 
Weinstein’s pocket is to stop watching his movies). 
 52.  See Megan Twohey and Jodi Kantor, Weinstein and His Accusers Reach Tentative $25 Million 
Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Published Dec. 11, 2019, Updated Jan. 22, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/11/us/harvey-weinstein-settlement.html [https://perma.cc/K5TA-
SRPK] (noting that $25 million of the tentative settlement is set to go directly to Weinstein’s accusers). 
Further, $12 million in legal fees for the company’s officers and directors (including Weinstein) is 
included in this tentative settlement. See id. 
 53.  See Lucy Osborne, Harvey Weinstein: fourth accuser opts out of settlement to pursue own 
claim, GUARDIAN (Jan. 19, 2020) https://www.theguardian.com/film/2020/jan/19/harvey-weinstein-
accuser-settlement [https://perma.cc/7GBF-5E6N]; Ransom and Del Real, supra note 36; see 
also Ransom, supra note 36 (noting Weinstein’s convictions and sentencing with respect to criminal 
charges in New York). 
 54.  U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGES ALLEGING SEX-BASED HARASSMENT 
(CHARGES FILED WITH EEOC) FY 2010 - FY 2019, 
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm [https://perma.cc/T7XG-
U247]. 
 55.  See U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, CHARGE STATISTICS (CHARGES FILED WITH 
EEOC) FY 1997 THROUGH FY 2019, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm 
[https://perma.cc/CY73-TTC4]. 
 56.  See EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 8; Nilofer Merchant, The Insidious Economic 
Impact of Sexual Harassment, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 29, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/11/the-insidious-
economic-impact-of-sexual-harassment [https://perma.cc/6D83-2L2N]; cf. Chatterjee, supra note 8 
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misbehavior originated from a famous movie executive—as opposed to an 
employee in a less glamorous workplace—renders the harassment perhaps 
different in degree but certainly not in kind. As one of Weinstein’s own victims 
observed, Weinstein’s behavior constituted “[t]extbook sexual harassment,”57 
encompassing the same sort of unchecked power dynamics that could exist in a 
variety of settings.58 Therefore, there may be lessons to draw from Weinstein’s 
downfall that could inform approaches to minimizing workplace sexual 
harassment more generally. 
In the weeks and months following the Weinstein scandal breaking—
particularly as additional accounts of workplace harassment began to emerge 
across various other industries— governmental officials, industry insiders, and 
members of the public wondered how such appalling and disgraceful behavior 
could have gone on unabated for so long in so many industries.59 More 
affirmatively, many of these same individuals began the search for solutions to 
this problem—began trying to examine ways in which inappropriate sexual 
misconduct at work might be minimized or eliminated altogether. The vast 
majority of businesses already seemed to have undertaken steps that, at first 
glance, one reasonably might conclude would prevent this behavior. For 
example, in a survey of human resources professionals conducted in the fall of 
2017, approximately 90% of the respondents said that their companies had a 
policy against sexual harassment.60 In the same survey, approximately 71% of 
respondents said that their companies conduct some form of sexual harassment 
training.61 
Despite these commitments to policies and training, however, sexual 
harassment claims continue to deluge the EEOC, comprising a substantial 
portion of the complaints that the agency receives every year.62 Such statistics 
naturally beg the question of the effectiveness of current practices. If companies 
have been adhering to these policies and practicing this training, how could 
#MeToo and similar movements have exposed such far-reaching incidents of 
harassment in such a wide variety of workplaces? Apparently, policies against 
workplace harassment are not enough; training alone will not abate this problem. 
 
(citing survey finding that 81% of women have experienced sexual harassment at work); Stahler, supra 
note 51 (positing that at least one third of all women experience sexual harassment at work). 
 57.  Farrow, supra note 1. 
 58.  See id. (quoting Weinstein victim’s analogy that “[i]t’s a pretty clear case of sexual harassment 
when your superior, the C.E.O., asks one of their inferiors, a temp, to have sex with them, essentially in 
exchange for mentorship”). 
 59.  See, e.g., Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1; Faughnder et al., supra note 
33; Jessica Valenti, It’s No Accident That Sexual Harassers Rise Up the Ranks, GUARDIAN (Nov. 4, 2017, 
6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/04/sexual-harassers-rise-ranks-red-
flag [https://perma.cc/8XQF-7PAT]. 
 60.  See Maya Rhodan, Does Sexual Harassment Training Work? Here’s What the Research Shows, 
TIME (Nov. 21, 2017), http://time.com/5032074/does-sexual-harassment-training-work-heres-what-the-
research-shows/ [https://perma.cc/P62A-KZNB]; EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11. 
 61.  See Rhodan, supra note 60. 
 62.  See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text. 
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Rather, research indicates that other steps must be taken to deter workers from 
engaging in—and companies from tolerating—this type of inappropriate 
workplace behavior.63 
A. The Inadequacy of Traditional Mechanisms for Countering 
Harassment at Work 
Despite the increased attention that has been paid to sexual harassment in 
the workplace, much of the effort that companies have made in attempting to 
counter this conduct is ineffective and aimed at limiting their own liability. For 
example, while sexual harassment training has become standard practice in the 
majority of workplaces,64 a wealth of research suggests the inadequacy and 
ineffectiveness of this training.65 For one thing, many employees fail to take such 
training seriously and are simply “clicking through a PowerPoint, checking a box 
that you read the employee handbook or attending a mandatory seminar at which 
someone lectures about harassment while attendees glance at their phones.”66 
Compounding this problem, the financial and logistical costs associated with in-
person training programs mean that many companies now rely upon online 
tutorials, thereby making it even more difficult to ensure that employees 
undertake such training thoughtfully and seriously.67 Even more concerning, for 
many companies that implement these programs, reducing workplace 
harassment may not be the only (or even the primary) goal: The focus, instead, 
is on corporate self-protection—on “reduc[ing] the likelihood of being named in 
harassment suits or . . . check[ing] a box for E.E.O.C. purposes.”68 
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(Nov. 17, 2017, 11:07 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2017/11/17/why-
sexual-harassment-training-doesnt-stop-harassment/?utm_term=.5c80671c60a1 [https://perma.cc/KR32-
86KN]. 
 65.  See, e.g., Frank Dobbin & Alexandra Kalev, Training Programs and Reporting Systems Won’t 
End Sexual Harassment. Promoting Women Will, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 15, 2017), 
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 66.  See Miller, supra note 10; cf. McGregor, supra note 64 (describing the “disdain” expressed 
toward sexual harassment training programs, even by the very individuals who promote such programs). 
 67.  See McGregor, supra note 64. 
 68.  See Miller, supra note 10 (quoting a psychologist at Rice University). Sexual harassment 
training can bolster an employer’s defense against certain types of sexual harassment claims. Under 
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Even when taken seriously by employers and employees, workplace sexual 
harassment training exhibits severe limitations in its usefulness. Studies indicate 
that such training does not appear to be effective either at reducing the number 
of incidents of harassment in the workplace or at shifting the workplace culture 
toward one that views harassment as a serious problem.69 More specifically, 
while this training generally is credited with increasing employees’ knowledge 
about sexual harassment—for example, teaching workers about the definition of 
harassment and how to report alleged violations in the workplace70—this 
increased knowledge does not translate into behavioral changes among those 
inclined to engage in harassment.71 In fact, according to at least some research, 
harassment training actually can reinforce some gender stereotypes, at least in 
the short term, and can make participants uncomfortable, prompting defensive 
jokes.72 Such findings have led one set of researchers to assert that men who 
already appeared prone toward engaging in sexual harassment “come out of 
training with significantly worse attitudes toward harassment, thinking it is no 
big deal.”73 
B. The Magic Bullet: Changing the Workplace Culture 
If policies and training do not seem to be adequately decreasing the 
incidence of sexual harassment at work, what other steps might employers take 
to accomplish this goal? Tellingly, research has revealed that changing the 
culture within a workplace can reduce the amount of harassment at work.74 
Research in this area suggests that “[t]o actually prevent harassment, companies 
need to create a culture in which women are treated as equals and employees 
treat one another with respect.”75 The EEOC has echoed this finding, asserting 
that “[w]orkplace culture has the greatest impact on allowing harassment to 
flourish, or conversely, in preventing harassment.”76 
A workplace’s culture encompasses the “patterns of accepted behavior” at 
work, and “the beliefs and values that promote and reinforce [these patterns of 
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 75.  Miller, supra note 10. 
 76.  See EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at v; see also id. at 31. 
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behavior].”77 One can think of the “patterns of behavior” within an organization 
as those things that are deemed acceptable in that workplace—things that are 
“OK to do.”78 Changing these mechanisms—both patterns of behavior and the 
individual beliefs that underlie such behavior—is no easy task. To the contrary, 
seeking such change means undoing opinions, principles, activities and programs 
that may have come to infuse the very fabric of the workplace. In the sexual 
harassment context, this means that organizations must not simply go through 
the motions, but rather must “create a culture in which women are treated as 
equals and employees treat one another with respect.”79 It means moving from a 
workplace culture where behavior like Weinstein’s has been tolerated and 
enabled to one where such behavior is not simply no longer the norm, but rather 
will shock the conscience of those observing such conduct. 
While shifting a workplace’s culture may be difficult, a wealth of research 
supports the effectiveness of such efforts in combating harassment. For example, 
one study found that organizational climate—defined as the “organizational 
characteristics that communicate tolerance of sexual harassment”—plays a 
significant role in facilitating sexual harassment in the workplace.80 Specifically, 
researchers found that female employees who believe that their organization 
tolerates sexual harassment (demonstrated by complaints not being taken 
seriously, by the presence of risks associated with complaining, and by the 
unlikelihood of perpetrators being punished) end up experiencing higher levels 
of harassment at work.81 This undoubtedly would dovetail with the experiences 
of employees at the Weinstein Company: Surely, an employee of the Weinstein 
Company, observing the company’s Board of Directors renew Weinstein’s 
contract in the face of multiple allegations of harassment82—allegations that had 
become common knowledge among employees and others83—would not believe 
that he/she was working within a workplace culture that truly took seriously such 
inappropriate conduct. Potential victims therefore might stay silent out of fear of 
not being taken seriously, and other potential perpetrators might feel empowered 
to mirror Weinstein’s conduct. In other words, such employees might not simply 
feel disgruntled about the way in which the Weinstein Company handled 
concerns about harassment; according to this research, such employees would be 
more likely themselves ultimately to experience sexual harassment at work. 
So how could companies like the Weinstein Company truly “change the 
culture” within the workplace to emphasize that harassment will not be tolerated? 
While no single formula will work within every organization, research supports 
 
 77.  Andersen, supra note 74. 
 78.  See id. 
 79.  Miller, supra note 10. 
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 81.  Id. at 586. 
 82.  See Faughnder et al., supra note 33; Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32. 
 83.  See supra notes 2–6 and accompanying text. 
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several key themes that seem effective in triggering workplace cultural change: 
Organizations must foster a workplace culture that exhibits a serious and sober 
approach to sexual harassment; they must respond to incidents of harassment 
with swift and severe ramifications; and they must foster an overall power 
structure that inhibits those in power from taking advantage of others who fall 
lower in the hierarchy.84 
1. Changing the Workplace Culture by Modeling a Serious, Sober 
Approach to Workplace Sexual Harassment 
One way in which employers might alter their workplace culture to decrease 
the incidence of sexual harassment more forcefully is to model the seriousness 
with which they condemn such misbehavior. As one author who studies cultural 
change has pointed out, “normalization” forms an important part of creating 
cultural change.85 Before individuals will change the way that they behave, 
“[they] need to feel that ‘people like me act this way, and people I admire and 
want to emulate act this way.’”86 Generating change requires “giv[ing] 
[employees] some evidence that their peers (at least the ones they like) and their 
role models are behaving in those ways.”87 Thus, employers must convey to their 
workforce that inappropriate sexual misconduct at work will not be 
countenanced or accepted—that such misconduct falls outside the bounds of 
permissible workplace behavior. 
Part of normalizing a culture that refuses to countenance harassment (or, 
perhaps, de-normalizing a culture in which harassment is accepted) involves 
destroying any notion that a workplace harasser can “get away with” such 
behavior and eliminating any impunity that the harasser otherwise might feel. 
One renowned researcher in this area concurs that “[i]mpunity plays a large 
role.”88 According to this researcher, men who already possess certain 
characteristics will engage in sexually harassing behavior when they are put in 
situations where the system suggests that they can do so while avoiding 
punishment.89 The EEOC Task Force more straightforwardly observed that 
“[o]rganizational cultures that tolerate harassment have more of it, and 
workplaces that are not tolerant of harassment have less of it.”90 Organizations 
 
 84.  See infra §§ II.B.1-3. 
 85.  See Andersen, supra note 74. 
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 89.  See id. (quoting Pryor, a psychologist). 
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therefore must model, from the top down, the seriousness with which they 
approach concerns about harassment, from having top executives repeatedly 
vocalize their condemnation of such behavior,91 to having leaders attend and/or 
endorse any harassment training.92 
Applying these ideas to the Weinstein scandal makes clear the extent to 
which the Weinstein Company modeled the exact opposite environment that 
would be required to minimize harassment in the workplace. The notion of 
Weinstein or any of his key executives modeling a zero tolerance attitude 
towards sexual harassment should be laughable to anyone who knows about 
Weinstein’s misdeeds and the extensive cover-up that his staff engineered.93 
Countless witnesses have come forward in the wake of the scandal attesting to 
the perceived invincibility of Weinstein within the organization—the extent to 
which Weinstein operated seemingly unaccountable to anyone within the 
company.94 As one victim observed about Weinstein’s behavior, “I know that 
everybody—I mean everybody—in Hollywood knows that it’s happening . . . . 
He’s not even really hiding . . . . [T]he way he does it, so many people are 
involved and see what’s happening. But everyone’s too scared to say anything.”95 
Even those who attempted to turn to the Weinstein Company’s human resources 
department to address their concerns found themselves faced with an entity that 
refused to act: According to one insider, such victims purportedly were told, 
“This is his company. If you don’t like it, you can leave.”96 
Organizations can model a serious and sober approach to sexual harassment 
not only by putting in place effective policies and procedures that oppose 
harassment97 (something that most organizations have been doing with minimal 
effect for decades),98 but also by backing up those policies and procedures with 
resources in the form of money and time.99 Specifically, research indicates that 
the most effective sexual harassment training lasts at least 4 hours and takes place 
in person, tailored to the particular workplace.100 Such robust training won’t 
come cheap. Yet by demonstrating the seriousness with which the employer 
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 92.  See Rhodan, supra note 60. 
 93.  Cf. Farrow, supra note 1 (explaining that many current and former executives and assistants at 
the Weinstein Company knew of the allegations and helped cover up for Weinstein). 
 94.  See Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1 (discussing many victims’ fear of retaliation by Weinstein 
if they reported his misconduct and observing that “[s]peaking up could have been costly”); Farrow, supra 
note 1 (echoing victims’ concerns regarding retaliation by Weinstein). 
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views harassment, the employer may be able to convey to its workers the extent 
to which such behavior will not be tolerated. 
2. Changing the Workplace Culture by Creating Concrete Negative 
Ramifications for Misbehavior 
In addition to modeling a serious and sober approach to workplace 
harassment, organizations can change their workplace cultures to make 
harassment less prevalent by creating significant and concrete negative 
ramifications for such misconduct. As one group of researchers has advised, 
“organizations need to spell out the stakes of what’s to be lost with 
harassment.”101 These researchers recommend linking such misbehavior to 
specified negative outcomes, and claim that highly publicized negative 
ramifications for harassers signal to employers and employees just what the 
stakes are related to their workplace behavior.102 They note, for example, the 
impact of television host Matt Lauer losing his reported $20 million salary as a 
result of his alleged workplace sexual misconduct, asserting that “[w]hen the 
risks are tied to bank accounts and budgets, powerful people are more inclined 
to listen.”103 Again, the EEOC has backed up this research, advising “at all levels, 
across all positions, an organization must have systems in place that hold 
employees accountable . . . [by] ensur[ing] that those who engage in harassment 
are held responsible in a meaningful, appropriate, and proportional 
manner . . . .”104 
Publicizing the negative ramifications for harassment can further nudge a 
workplace toward cultural change. If employees know the risks for misbehavior 
and know about examples where those consequences have been implemented, 
they may think twice about engaging in such conduct. One attorney who leads 
sexual harassment training for his corporate clients has observed that top 
executives at the firms with which he works have grown more open to one-on-
one coaching, perhaps in part because recent headlines regarding workplace 
harassment have served as a reminder of the financial stakes associated with this 
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behavior.105 In the view of this attorney, “[t]he economic reality of [workplace 
sexual harassment] is hitting home more than it ever has.”106 
In many employment settings, however, publicizing the negative 
ramifications of harassment seems to butt up against a culture of secrecy, where 
even those workers with a known record for inappropriate behavior find their 
misconduct shielded from public view.107 Sometimes this secrecy works to 
protect the company, whether from any legal consequences associated with 
employing the wrongdoer, or from the reputational harm resulting from not 
taking action sooner.108 Sometimes this secrecy may flow out of contractual 
obligations, such as when management quietly settles harassment claims brought 
by employees, simultaneously demanding confidentiality as part of any such 
settlement.109 Sometimes the secrecy flows directly out of the harasser’s position 
of power, as seemed to be the case in Weinstein’s situation.110 As previously 
noted, Weinstein reportedly enforced a code of silence throughout his company, 
barring any criticism that could harm the company’s or leaders’ reputations.111 
Eliminating such imposed silence and making public any credible allegations of 
harassment can communicate to members of the organization (including those 
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Finally, a host of contractual restrictions—from settlement agreements containing confidentiality 
provisions to nondisclosure and/or non-disparagement agreements—might limit the employer’s ability to 
make specific examples of harassment public. See, e.g., S.B. 1300, 2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) 
(prohibiting employers in some circumstances from requiring employees to sign non-disparagement 
agreements that preclude employees from disclosing information about unlawful acts in the workplace, 
including sexual harassment). 
 107.  See John B. Pryor, Sexual Harassment Proclivities in Men, 17 SEX ROLES 269, 271 (1987) 
(citing research indicating that “sexual harassers typically have reputations for sexually exploitative 
behaviors”). 
 108.  See LaMagna I, supra note 7 (arguing that “[o]ne major reason why repeat offenders can 
continue harassing for years [is that s]ome employers are reluctant to share information about a sexual 
harasser because they are embarrassed it took them so long to fire him”). 
 109.  See Kari Paul & Maria LaMagna, The Damaging, Incalculable Price of Sexual Harassment, 
MARKETWATCH (Jan. 9, 2018), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/as-harvey-weinstein-takes-a-leave-
of-absence-heres-how-much-sexual-harassment-costs-companies-and-victims-2017-10-07 
[https://perma.cc/BQE5-84JY] (hereinafter “LaMagna II”) (quoting a law professor who suggests that 
“[w]hen alleged perpetrators are prominent at their companies, employers sometimes decide it’s worth 
settling with alleged victims rather than getting rid of the perpetrator”); see, e.g., Kantor & Twohey, supra 
note 1 (noting that there have been at least eight settlements between Weinstein and women who he has 
allegedly harassed). 
 110.  See Farrow, supra note 1 (citing victim who posited that everyone in Hollywood knew about 
Weinstein’s harassment “[b]ut everyone’s too scared to say anything”). 
 111.  See Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1. 
2020 DISGORGING HARVEY WEINSTEIN’S SALARY 303 
who might potentially engage in sexual misbehavior) that the organization takes 
seriously this type of misconduct and will not tolerate it within the workplace.112 
To be sure, some research disputes the efficacy of using negative 
ramifications to try and change behavior, indicating instead that rewards or 
positive reinforcement play a larger role in encouraging individuals to undertake 
significant change.113 But even if “shaming” or “punishing” may not alter the 
behavior of an individual harasser, publicizing the negative consequences that 
flow from misbehavior might shift the culture within an organization as a whole: 
The public imposition of negative ramifications—particularly negative financial 
ramifications—upon those who engage in harassment demonstrates to an 
organization’s employees and to the broader public that harassment is not part of 
the “patterns of accepted behavior” that form the culture in this particular 
workplace.114 Moreover, as potential targets and victims of harassment observe 
that their organization takes such behavior seriously by imposing negative 
consequences on employees who engage in such misconduct, they may be more 
willing to speak up themselves when faced with such inappropriate conduct.115 
Thus, even if individual harassers find themselves personally unchanged by 
these negative consequences, those individuals may soon come to understand 
that they no longer fit within the culture of the organization that refuses to permit 
behavior such as theirs. 
 
3. Changing the Workplace Culture by Altering the Power Structure 
within an Organization 
In addition to modeling a serious and sober approach to harassment and 
implementing concrete negative ramifications for misbehavior, employers also 
can transform the culture of their workplace by modifying the broader power 
structure within their organization. Research bears out that the balance of power 
within an organization impacts the extent to which that organization’s culture 
tolerates (and even encourages) harassment. As one set of researchers has 
observed, “harassment flourishes in workplaces where men dominate in 
management and women have little power.”116 These researchers likewise posit 
 
 112.  See Elizabeth C. Tippett, Public Shaming of Workplace Harassers May Force Employers to 
Stop Protecting Them, CONVERSATION (Nov. 8, 2017), https://theconversation.com/public-shaming-of-
workplace-harassers-may-force-employers-to-stop-protecting-them-87139 [https://perma.cc/ZXD9-
EYXR]. Having corporations show public support for victims of harassment not only might minimize the 
instances of harassment, but also might minimize the negative impact on victims. See generally Slaughter 
et al., supra note 101 (noting that “cynicism from leadership regarding sexual misconduct can lead to what 
clinical psychologists refer to as ‘institutional betrayal’—where the trauma of an assault is compounded 
by bureaucratic incompetence or opposition or indifference from management”) (citation omitted). 
 113.  See, e.g., Andersen, supra note 74 (positing that “[p]eople will change their behavior if they 
see the new behavior as easy, rewarding and normal.”) 
 114.  See id. 
 115.  See Tippett, supra note 112. 
 116.  Dobbin & Kalev, supra note 65. 
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that harassment arises in organizations where few women occupy “core” 
positions.117 Accordingly, companies could decrease harassment in their 
workplaces if they hired and promoted women in greater numbers.118 
Researchers already have established that access to power alters the manner 
in which an individual thinks. In one study, researchers found that “elevated 
power increases the psychological distance that an individual feels from 
others.”119 Other studies have found that “powerful people consider others’ 
perspectives less.”120 Power increases individuals’ anticipation of rewards while 
decreasing their perceptions of threat,121 “increases individuals’ optimism in 
viewing risks” and heightens “their propensity to engage in risky behavior,”122 
and “prompts people to perceive sexual interest” when none actually is 
present.123 Furthermore, individuals with greater access to power show greater 
likelihood to behave in an impulsive manner, which can manifest in such 
individuals violating workplace ethical rules.124 In one experiment, researchers 
observed “participants in power [taking] candy from children without blinking 
an eye.”125 Examining findings like this, the EEOC Task Force Report observed 
“superstar status can be a breeding ground for harassment.”126 
Without question, with his tremendous resources, broad networks of 
influence, and virtually limitless control within the Weinstein Company, Harvey 
Weinstein fell squarely into this description of the superstar employee. 
Moreover, if even only some of the accounts of Weinstein’s inappropriate 
behavior are true, his behavior fits perfectly within the laundry list of traits noted 
above: He either never considered whether the women whom he accosted had 
any sexual interest in him, or mistakenly perceived interest despite its utter 
absence; he appeared to focus almost entirely on the “reward” (the sexual 
 
 117.  See id. 
 118.  See id. (observing that “[i]n industries and workplaces where women are well represented in 
the core jobs, harassment is significantly less likely to occur”); Miller, supra note 10 (noting that 
companies employing greater numbers of women in management experience less sexual harassment). 
 119.  Pamela Smith & Yaacov Trope, You Focus on the Forest When You’re In Charge of the Trees: 
Power Priming and Abstract Information Processing, 90 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., No. 4, 
578, 578 (2006); see Slaughter et al., supra note 101 (discussing Smith & Trope study). 
 120.  Slaughter et al., supra note 101 (citations omitted); see Dacher Keltner, Sex, Power, and the 
Systems That Enable Men Like Harvey Weinstein, HARV. BUS. REV. (Oct. 13, 2017), 
https://hbr.org/2017/10/sex-power-and-the-systems-that-enable-men-like-harvey-weinstein 
[https://perma.cc/E7JB-YLDV] (observing that individuals in powerful groups may develop “empathy 
deficits” and be less able to read others’ emotions and/or understand others’ perspectives). 
 121.  See Cameron Anderson & Jennifer L. Berdahl, The Experience of Power: Examining the Effects 
of Power on Approach and Inhibition Tendencies, 83 J. OF PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL., No. 6, 1362, 
1373–74 (2002); see Slaughter et al., supra note 101. 
 122.  Cameron Anderson & Adam D. Galinsky, Power, Optimism, and Risk-Taking, 36 EUR. J. OF 
SOC. PSYCHOL., 511, 529 (2006); Slaughter et al., supra note 101. 
 123.  Slaughter et al., supra note 101; see Keltner, supra note 120 (discussing how power can 
“manifest in inappropriate sexual behavior in male-dominated contexts”). 
 124.  Keltner, supra note 120; see EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 24 (asserting that 
“privilege can lead to a self-view that they are above the rules, which can foster mistreatment”). 
 125.  Keltner, supra note 120. 
 126.  EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 24. 
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conquest), while assuming that any “threat”—whether it be legal liability or bad 
publicity—would be dealt with by his vast staff of underlings; he manifested an 
inherent belief that he was “above the rules” that applied to everyone else.127 
Weinstein’s almost omnipotent presence within the company also ensured the 
absence of any real check on his behavior: The Weinstein Company’s Board 
readily accepted excuses for his misdeeds,128 and the company’s human 
resources department was described as “a place where you went to when you 
didn’t want anything to get done . . . [b]ecause everything funneled back to 
Harvey.”129 
Of course, simply altering the power structure within an organization will 
not serve as an automatic fix for the dynamics that contribute to sexual 
harassment at work. But, allowing women to fill more significant roles would 
give potential victims of workplace sexual misconduct (who are predominantly 
female)130 more allies at the top of the corporate hierarchy,131 while also 
providing leaders who are “more likely to be watchfully present in the contexts 
in which the powerful abuse power.”132 Moreover, placing women into positions 
of power can alter the workplace culture in a much more fundamental way, by 
more generally curbing the marginalization of women at work.133 The impact of 
such a shift in perception could be significant: Weinstein’s own attorney, in 
endeavoring to explain her client’s behavior, referred to Weinstein as “an old 
dinosaur learning new ways.”134 Perhaps shaking up the corporate hierarchy to 
increase the power and authority of women—and to remove power from men 
who abuse such authority—would more effectively drive home to “old 
dinosaurs” like Weinstein that misbehavior which might have gone unnoticed in 
the past no longer will be tolerated by those in power.135 
 
 127.  See Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1. 
 128.  See Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1. 
 129.  Farrow, supra note 1 (quoting a former female executive at the Weinstein Company). 
 130.  See Chatterjee, supra note 8 (reporting that (1) 81% of women, compared to 43% of men, claim 
to have experienced some form of sexual harassment, and (2) 38% of women have report being harassed 
in the workplace); cf. Wan, supra note 88 (noting that it is “almost always men doing the harassing”). 
 131.  See EEOC Task Force Report, supra note 11, at 28 (citing the existence of significant power 
disparities in a workplace as a risk factor leading to harassment); cf. id. at 26 (observing that “sexual 
harassment of women is more likely to occur in workplaces that have primarily male employees”). 
 132.  Keltner, supra note 120. 
 133.  See Jessica Fink, Gender Sidelining and the Problem of Unactionable Discrimination, 29 STAN. 
L. & POL’Y REV. 57, 100–03 (2018) (citations omitted). 
 134.  Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1. 
 135.  This effort to alter the power structure within an organization and to include women in greater 
numbers must involve more than a mere image or illusion of promoting and valuing women. Rather, there 
must be substance behind this position, actually providing women with meaningful power. Indeed, 
Weinstein himself has long positioned himself as a “liberal lion [and] a champion of women,” see Kantor 
& Twohey, supra note 1, even producing a documentary on campus sexual assault and helping to endow 
a faculty chair at Rutgers University in Gloria Steinem’s name, see id. Yet without providing women 
within his organization with actual power—the power to model appropriate treatment of women in the 
workplace and to successfully demand change in the face of inappropriate conduct—such shallow nods 
to gender equality lack any real impact. See id. (observing that, simultaneous with Weinstein’s 
humanitarian efforts, “[d]ozens of Mr. Weinstein’s former and current employees, from assistants to top 
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III. USING THE FAITHLESS SERVANT DOCTRINE AND OTHER DISGORGEMENT 
STRATEGIES TO HIT HARASSERS WHERE IT HURTS (I.E., IN THEIR WALLETS) 
While multiple experts seem to agree that a key to decreasing sexual 
harassment at work involves changing the culture of a workplace to render such 
behavior intolerable, uncertainty remains regarding how best to effectuate such 
a cultural change. What specific steps can organizations take to model a serious 
and sober approach to harassment, to create concrete negative ramifications for 
such behavior, and/or to alter the broader power structure in the workplace? 
When carefully-worded harassment policies and sophisticated harassment 
training sessions fail, might there be an opportunity to use a less conventional 
approach to drive this message home to an organization’s employees—both to 
perpetrators of harassment and to those in the workplace who merely observe 
such behavior? Faced with such daunting questions, this paper examines one 
novel possibility: whether a fairly unusual approach to addressing sexual 
harassment at work might have an impact on reducing this phenomenon. 
Specifically, this paper asks whether a little-discussed doctrine of remedies law 
called the faithless servant doctrine, along with similar compensation forfeiture 
tools, could present one way for companies to convey more effectively to their 
employees their refusal to countenance harassment at work, perhaps altering the 
overall culture of the workplace. 
At its most basic level, the faithless servant doctrine holds that “an agent is 
entitled to no compensation for conduct which is disobedient or which is a breach 
of his or her duty of loyalty.”136 The duty of loyalty “requires fiduciaries to 
exercise their authority in a good-faith attempt to advance corporate purposes . . . 
[and] prohibits fiduciaries from putting their own interests ahead of those of the 
shareholders.”137 The bad faith that forms the basis of a duty of loyalty breach 
“can result from any emotion [that] may cause a director to [intentionally] place 
his own interests, preferences or appetites before the welfare of the corporation, 
including hatred, lust, envy, revenge.”138 For example, an executive may breach 
their duty of loyalty by consciously causing the corporation to violate the law,139 
or by failing to exercise proper oversight over the corporation.140 Under the 
 
executives, said they knew of inappropriate conduct while they worked for him [but o]nly a handful said 
they ever confronted him”). 
 136.  Van Arsdale, supra note 13, § 2. 
 137.  Daniel Hemel & Dorothy S. Lund, Sexual Harassment and Corporate Law, 118 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1583, 1629 (2018) (hereinafter “Hemel & Lund II”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); see 
also Kaye v. Rosefielde, 121 A.3d 862, 869 (N.J. 2015) (observing that “[a]n employee must not while 
employed act contrary to the employer’s interest” (citations and internal quotations omitted)). 
 138.  Meena Yoo, Corporate Governance in a Post-Weinstein Era, FORDHAM J. OF CORP. & FIN. L. 
(Jan. 6, 2018), https://news.law.fordham.edu/jcfl/2018/01/06/corporate-governance-in-a-post-weinstein-
era [https://perma.cc/6UGR-22J9] (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 139.  See Hemel & Lund II, supra note 137, at 1630. 
 140.  See id.; Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32 (describing potential for board liability for breach of 
the duty of loyalty for exposing a company to unreasonable financial risk, whether negligently or with 
intent). 
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faithless servant doctrine, these types of disloyal or deceitful employees must 
forgo their compensation during any period of faithlessness.141 
Importantly, the faithless servant doctrine is grounded in restitution, not in 
compensation.142 Therefore, its focus is not on making a plaintiff-employer 
whole from its losses, but rather on disgorging the defendant-employee’s 
wrongful gain.143 Moreover, while the idea of forfeiture actually dates back 
centuries, with deep roots in the law of equity,144 modern courts have applied 
these forfeiture concepts with some frequency not just to ensure that an employer 
is made whole with respect to any loss caused by an employee’s breach of her 
fiduciary duties,145 but also to deter any further disloyalty by the employee, by 
disgorging any profits that might have flowed out of such a breach.146 
While the contours of the faithless servant doctrine can vary significantly 
from one jurisdiction to the next,147 and while some jurisdictions might refer to 
the remedy more generally as “disgorgement” or “forfeiture,” rather than as the 
“faithless servant doctrine,”148 the underlying notion of using compensation 
forfeiture to respond to wrongful conduct by employees who breach their 
fiduciary duties remains a theme throughout this area of the law. Applied across 
a broad range of cases and circumstances—whatever name may be used to 
reference the doctrine—these tools represent powerful means of addressing 
 
 141.  Van Arsdale, supra note 13, § 2. 
 142.  See Manning Gilbert Warren III, Equitable Clawback: An Essay on Restoration of Executive 
Compensation, 12 UNIV. PA. J. BUS. L. 1135, 1136 (2010). 
 143.  See Dobbs, supra note 14, § 4.1(1) (describing restitution as “a return or restoration of what the 
defendant has gained in a transaction”); More on Faithless Servants, WORKPLACE PROF BLOG (Jan. 29, 
2010), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof_blog/2010/01/more-on-faithless-servants.html 
[https://perma.cc/4829-PGSM] (characterizing forfeiture as “a one-way restitution claim since the 
employee can’t seek to recover in quantum meruit the reasonable value of the services he did render”); 
FRIEBERGER HABER LLP, What is the Faithless Servant Doctrine and Why is it a Potent Weapon for 
Employers?, (Nov. 29, 2016), https://fhnylaw.com/faithless-servant-doctrine-potent-weapon-employers/ 
[https://perma.cc/6GFQ-VH4V] (observing that, under the faithless servant doctrine, a breaching 
employee “must forfeit all compensation earned since the first date of employment, even though the 
employee’s services may have otherwise benefitted the employer . . . ,” and characterizing any value that 
an employee may have provided to the employer through his or her loyal services as “irrelevant”). 
 144.  See George P. Roach, Compensation Forfeiture: Stacking Remedies Against Disloyal Agents 
and Employees, 47 ST. MARY’S L.J. 249, 251 (2015) (observing that “[t]he principles underlying 
compensation forfeiture against disloyal fiduciaries date back in the law of equity to before 1600”). 
 145.  See Dobbs, supra note 14, § 3.1 (observing that “[t]he stated goal of [] damages[] is 
compensation of the plaintiff for legally recognized losses . . . [in] an effort to put the plaintiff in his or 
her rightful position”); Roach, supra note 144, at 307–08 (discussing the goal of disgorgement which is 
“compensation, punishment, and deterrence”) (citations omitted). 
 146.  See Karen Rubin, Disloyal GC’s Can Be Required to Disgorge Salary, Says NJ High Court—
Even if No Economic Harm, LAW FOR LAWYERS TODAY (Nov. 5, 2015), 
https://www.thelawforlawyerstoday.com/2015/11/disloyal-gcs-can-be-required-to-disgorge-salary-says-
nj-high-court/ [https://perma.cc/GW8G-PG4A] (discussing deterrent effect of disgorgement). 
 147.  See infra § III.B.2. 
 148.  See Roach, supra note 144, at 304–09 (noting that “[c]ompensation forfeiture is sometimes 
equated to the faithless servant doctrine . . . ,” and that “forfeiture is a remedy in equity that resembles 
disgorgement as they both share the driving rationale of denying unjust enrichment to a disloyal 
fiduciary”). 
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fiduciary breaches by workers.149 Moreover, while many cases that apply these 
principles deal with financial wrongdoing and/or other instances of usurping 
corporate opportunities, there is at least some precedent for disgorging an 
employee’s compensation when their breach consists of sexual misconduct at 
work. 
To be sure, applying the faithless servant doctrine to a situation involving 
sexual harassment by an employee would require, as a predicate matter, 
establishing that engaging in sexual harassment actually constitutes a breach of 
the employee’s fiduciary duties. Courts admittedly have reached mixed 
conclusions in this respect. In Pozner v. Fox Broadcasting Company, the court 
asserted that there was no precedent for allowing “sexual harassment by an 
executive, without more, [to form] the basis of a breach of the duty of loyalty 
claim.”150 Other courts, however, have seemed somewhat more amenable to this 
argument.151 More importantly, engaging in sexual harassment seems to fit 
squarely within how courts have conceived of fiduciary duty breaches more 
broadly: If courts assume that acting in a manner that cuts against the company’s 
best interests constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty,152 then an employee who 
sexually harasses employees or others connected with the company clearly seems 
to fall within such a prohibition.153 
As discussed in greater detail below, however, the faithless servant doctrine 
and other compensation forfeiture tools may be a fairly clumsy way of addressing 
sexual harassment in some contexts: While some aspects of these doctrines 
render them an appropriate response to misconduct like Weinstein’s, other 
aspects of the Weinstein scandal—particularly, the Weinstein Company’s own 
apparent complicity in Weinstein’s wrongdoing—raise significant questions 
about the applicability of these powerful tools to bad actors like Weinstein. 
Where the employer who would benefit from any compensation disgorgement 
ignored (and perhaps even permitted) the underlying breach of fiduciary duties 
 
 149.  Notably, while it sometimes is assumed that only high-level employees within an organization 
owe fiduciary duties to an employer, in fact all employees—even lower level workers—may be held to 
have a duty of loyalty toward their employers. See J. Robert Smith, Fiduciary Duties of Employees, 
HOLLAND & HART: FIDUCIARY LAW BLOG (Nov. 3, 2014), 
https://www.fiduciarylawblog.com/2014/11/fiduciary-duties-of-employees.html [https://perma.cc/684T-
XVB7] (observing that even “low-level” employees owe fiduciary duties to their employer); see Eckard 
Brandes, Inc. v. Riley, 338 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that even “low-level” or “ordinary” 
employees may have duty of loyalty toward employer (citations omitted)). 
 150.  Pozner v. Fox Broadcasting Company, 74 N.Y.S.3d 711, 714 (N.Y. App. Div. 2018). 
 151.  See Hemel & Lund II, supra note 137, at 1623–25 (discussing derivative action alleging breach 
of duty of loyalty brought against company and former CEO based upon former CEO’s sexual misconduct 
and direction that the company expend resources to further his sexual relations); see also id. at 1624 
(quoting the Chancellor’s observation that “[t]he complaint clearly . . . states a sufficiently colorable claim 
that Hewitt breached his fiduciary duty by engaging in conduct that led to his termination” (citation 
omitted)). 
 152.  See Yoo, supra note 138. 
 153.  See id. (observing that “[b]y sexually harassing employees and potential employees, Weinstein 
abused his position of power . . . [and h]is conduct can only be described as self-serving at the risk of the 
Weinstein Company’s business interests”) (citations omitted). 
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to take place, as the Weinstein Company may have done here, there may be 
serious concerns about applying these forfeiture principles without some 
significant modifications that would divert any gains away from the complicit 
employer and toward the victims of the sexual misconduct and/or the company’s 
shareholders. 
A. Astra, USA v. Bildman: A Case Study in the Faithless Servant 
Doctrine Applied to the Sexual Harassment Context 
Perhaps more than any other case in which the faithless servant doctrine has 
been applied, the 1981 case of Astra, USA v. Bildman demonstrates the power of 
this doctrine to respond to high-level executives like Harvey Weinstein who 
engage in sexual and other misconduct at work.154 In 1981, Astra 
Pharmaceuticals (“Astra”) hired Lars Bildman to serve as its president and chief 
executive officer, as well as to serve as a member of the board of directors of two 
of its subsidiaries.155 For more than 15 years, Bildman performed well in his 
position, successfully implementing corporate strategy, effecting significant 
management changes, and overseeing substantial growth within the company.156 
During the final five years of his employment, “[f]rom 1991 through 1996, 
Astra’s overall profit met or exceeded” established goals, and Bildman’s 
compensation unsurprisingly increased.157 
In late 1995, Astra learned of allegations that Bildman and other members 
of Astra senior management had been engaged in workplace sexual 
harassment.158 Among the charges that eventually emerged were allegations by 
a former secretary who had received a payoff and left the company after Bildman 
had forced her into sexual relations,159 as well as settlement payments to at least 
three other female employees who alleged that Bildman had sexually harassed 
them.160 In addition to denying any allegations of harassment,161 Bildman refused 
to cooperate with Astra’s investigation and took various steps to stymie the 
investigation’s progress, including by asking former and current Astra 
employees to deny that he ever had acted improperly and directing a colleague 
to shred corporate documents and erase company computers.162 
Despite Bildman’s efforts at obstruction and cover-up, reports ultimately 
indicated a dozen instances of women being fondled or solicited for sexual favors 
by Bildman or other Astra executives during Bildman’s fifteen-year tenure at 
 
 154.  914 N.E.2d 36 (Mass. 2009). 
 155.  Id. at 40. 
 156.  See id. 
 157.  See id. 
 158.  See id. at 41. 
 159.  See id. at 40–41. 
 160.  See id. at 41. 
 161.  See id. at 42 (citing Bildman’s assertion that he and others in senior management had “very 
good records” concerning sexual harassment). 
 162.  See id. at 42–43. 
310 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 41:2 
Astra,163 leading the Astra Board of Directors to rescind Bildman’s employment 
contract and terminate him for cause.164 The EEOC also filed a complaint against 
Astra alleging a pattern and practice of sexual harassment against female workers 
at the company—a complaint that Astra ultimately settled (without admitting 
liability) by establishing a $9,850,000 victim compensation fund.165 Astra 
subsequently sued Bildman on a number of grounds, including fraud, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and breach of the duties of good faith and loyalty.166 After the 
jury found Bildman liable for, inter alia, breach of fiduciary duty, the trial court 
ordered an evidentiary hearing to determine whether Bildman’s compensation 
during the five year period of his disloyalty exceeded the value of the services 
that he had provided to Astra, thus justifying the disgorgement of his pay.167 
When the trial judge declined to order such disgorgement, Astra appealed, 
arguing that the court should require Bildman to forfeit all of the salary and 
bonuses that he received during the period in which he was disloyal to the 
company—an amount in excess of $5 million.168 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, applying New 
York Law, held that the faithless servant doctrine should require Bildman to 
forfeit all of the salary and bonuses that he received during this five-year 
period.169 The court explained that “an agent is held to . . . utmost fidelity in his 
dealings with his principal, and if he acts adversely to his employer in any part 
of the transaction . . . , it amounts to such a fraud upon the principal, as to forfeit 
any right to compensation for services.”170 Relying upon additional precedent, 
the court observed that “one who owes a duty of fidelity to a principal and who 
is faithless in the performance of his or her services is generally not entitled to 
recover compensation, whether commissions or salary.”171 Moreover, the court 
observed that this forfeiture would apply regardless of the value of the services 
that the employee might have provided during the period of the disloyalty. 
Indeed, the court declared that a faithless servant should lose the right to recover 
compensation, “even if he otherwise performed valuable services for the 
principal.”172 
B. Disgorging Compensation Beyond Astra: Additional Examples of 
 
 163.  See id. at 43. 
 164.  See id. 
 165.  See id. 
 166.  See id. at 44. 
 167.  See id. at 44–45. 
 168.  See id. at 45–46. 
 169.  See id. at 46. 
 170.  Id. at 47 (citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted). 
 171.  Id. (citation and quotation marks omitted); see also Soam Corp. v. Trane Co., 608 N.Y.S.2d 
177, 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (“An agent is held to utmost good faith in his dealings with his principal, 
and forfeits any right to compensation for his services if he acts adversely to his employer.”). 
 172.  Astra USA, 914 N.E.2d at 47; see also id. (“Nor does it make any difference that the services 
were beneficial to the principal, or that the principal suffered no provable damage as a result of the breach 
of fidelity by the agent.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted). 
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Compensation Forfeiture173 
While Astra provides one illustration of the faithless servant doctrine 
applied to sexual misconduct, various other cases have applied this sort of 
restitutionary theory to disgorge compensation from wrongdoing employees 
more generally. While some courts specifically refer to the faithless servant 
doctrine as the basis for this disgorgement, others refer to “forfeiture” or 
“disgorgement” to achieve the same result: the paying back of some or all 
compensation received by an employee who has breached his or her fiduciary 
duties.174 
1. Cases Applying Compensation Forfeiture to Fiduciary Breaches 
In a variety of cases, courts have applied concepts of compensation 
forfeiture to disgorge the salary and/or benefits of faithless fiduciaries. In 
Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., an investment banker was found to 
have breached his duties of loyalty and good faith by failing to disclose 
substantial compensation and opportunities that he had received through serving 
on various outside boards of directors.175 Rather than focus on the extent to which 
the banker’s misconduct may have harmed his former employer—what would 
have been the focus of a compensatory damages inquiry176—the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals required the banker to forfeit all compensation that he received 
from his employer following the date upon which his disloyalty began.177 In so 
doing, the court explicitly rejected the trial judge’s decision to only require the 
banker to forfeit part of his compensation in response to his breach.178 Instead, 
the Second Circuit held that New York law would require a complete 
disgorgement of all compensation that the banker had received following the date 
upon which his disloyalty began.179 According to the Second Circuit, “[i]t does 
not make any difference that the services rendered [by the breaching employee] 
were beneficial to the principal, or that the principal suffered no provable 
 
 173.  This section includes a description of how various jurisdictions have applied concepts of 
compensation disgorgement and/or forfeiture, with some courts adopting more stringent approaches than 
others. It is difficult to discern whether there is any “majority view” regarding the best manner in which 
to apply these concepts (and, if so, what that majority view might be). Nonetheless, as described in greater 
detail herein, these compensation disgorgement and/or forfeiture principles would seem to apply to 
misconduct like Weinstein’s even in jurisdictions that adopt a more rigid or limited view of these 
doctrines. See infra notes 217–20, 239 and accompanying text, § III.C. 
 174.  Other courts discuss this disgorgement in terms of “equitable clawback.” See, e.g., Warren, 
supra note 142, at 1136 (equating “equitable clawback” with the forfeiture of compensation inherent in 
the Faithless Servant Doctrine”). Agency principles also reflect notions of disgorgement, see 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 469 (AM. LAW INST. 1958), and the Restatement of Employment 
Law similarly echoes this view, see RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 
2019). 
 175.  344 F.3d 184, 189–95 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 176.  See supra note 145 and accompanying text. 
 177.  See Phansalkar, 334 F.3d at 208. 
 178.  See id. at 199–200. 
 179.  See id. at 200. 
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damages as a result of the breach of fidelity . . . .”180 Rather, the employee’s 
breaches of loyalty and good faith toward his employer themselves were 
sufficient to warrant a forfeiture of compensation.181 
In Enstar v. Grassgreen, Richard Grassgreen, a senior executive at Kinder-
Care, Inc., was found liable for breach of fiduciary duties related to a wide array 
of financial improprieties that occurred over a five year period of time.182 After 
the jury awarded compensatory and punitive damages to Grassgreen’s former 
employer initially totaling almost $20 million,183 the Alabama federal district 
court confronted the equitable issues in the case,184 including Enstar’s demand 
for forfeiture and recovery of all compensation that Grassgreen received during 
the entire five-year period of his breach of fiduciary duties.185 The court held that 
Grassgreen should be required to forfeit all of the compensation paid to him by 
Enstar during this period—an amount that totaled over $5.4 million.186 In 
reaching this conclusion, the court rejected Grassgreen’s argument that the court 
should impose only a partial forfeiture because “regardless of what he may have 
done wrong, he worked diligently on behalf of the corporation and the 
corporation profited from his work.”187 Instead, the court relied upon prior 10th 
Circuit authority which had held that “an agent who acts for his own benefit is 
not entitled to compensation which otherwise would be due him . . . , even if he 
thinks his actions will benefit the principal.”188 In the court’s view, applying such 
a stringent remedy to a breaching fiduciary like Grassgreen would emphasize the 
need for corporate officers and directors to execute their duties appropriately, in 
the best interests of the company.189 
In Kaye v. Rosefielde, the Supreme Court of New Jersey similarly indicated 
that the disgorgement of a faithless fiduciary’s compensation could constitute a 
proper remedy for a breach of fiduciary duty.190 In Kaye, the defendant—a former 
chief operating officer and de facto general counsel for the plaintiff—not only 
engaged in various acts of financial misconduct during his employment with the 
 
 180.  Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
 181.  See id. 
 182.  812 F. Supp. 1562, 1565–71 (M.D. Ala. 1993); see also Roach, supra note 144, at 256–61. 
 183.  See Enstar, 812 F. Supp. at 1569. Specifically, the jury set compensatory damages at just over 
$1.9 million and initially awarded $18 million in punitive damages, see id., an amount that the court 
remitted to $10 million, see id. at 1582. 
 184.  See Dobbs, supra note 14, § 2.6(2) (noting general rule that right to jury trial applies only to 
“common law” actions and not to equitable suits); see also Enstar, 812 F. Supp. at 1571 (noting that “the 
parties agreed [these] were not claims for which a right to jury trial existed”). 
 185.  See Enstar, 812 F. Supp. at 1571. 
 186.  See id. at 1575. 
 187.  Id. at 1573. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  See id. at 1574 (deeming it “of crucial importance to the economic well-being of this country 
for corporate officers and directors to understand without question that in the discharge of the duties of 
their offices they must subordinate their personal interests to the interests of the corporation which they 
serve”). 
 190.  121 A.3d 862, 873–74 (N.J. 2015). 
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plaintiff, but also made multiple inappropriate sexual advances toward 
colleagues, thus subjecting the plaintiff to a risk of sexual harassment liability.191 
In describing the ways in which the defendant breached his duty of loyalty, the 
trial court specifically cited, in addition to the defendant’s financial self-dealing, 
his “inappropriate conduct toward female employees.”192 Reversing the trial 
court, the New Jersey Supreme Court held that disgorgement of some portion of 
the defendant’s compensation during the periods of his disloyalty might be 
appropriate.193 In reaching this conclusion, the Kaye court specified the factors 
that courts should take into account in determining whether—and to what 
extent— disgorgement should apply to the compensation of a disloyal 
fiduciary:194 Courts should consider “the employee’s degree of responsibility and 
level of compensation, the number of acts of disloyalty, the extent to which those 
acts placed the employer’s business in jeopardy, and the degree of planning to 
undermine the employer that is undertaken by the employee.”195 
Thus, precedent across several jurisdictions supports responding to 
breaches of fiduciary duty by disgorging at least some of the compensation of 
the breaching employee.196 While by no means the “law of the land” when a court 
is faced with such misconduct—these cases admittedly serve as isolated 
examples of this approach—these disgorgement principles represent a powerful 
(if somewhat novel) way of dealing with fiduciary breaches. Moreover, while the 
vast majority of breaches that have triggered this disgorgement have involved 
some financial impropriety by an employee, cases like Astra and Kaye make 
clear that this remedy may also apply when the breaching employee has engaged 
in egregious workplace sexual harassment. 
2. The Varying Contours of Compensation Disgorgement 
While various courts have turned to compensation forfeiture to address 
wrongdoing by a fiduciary, different courts have adopted different rules in 
 
 191.  Id. at 864–66. 
 192.  Id. at 865. 
 193.  See id. at 874–75. Notably, in reaching this conclusion, the New Jersey Supreme Court did not 
specifically refer to the defendant’s sexual misconduct as the basis for this remedy, but rather appeared to 
rely on the defendant’s misconduct more broadly. See id. 
 194.  Id. at 874. 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  For additional examples of cases applying compensation disgorgement as a remedy, see, 
e.g.,William Floyd Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Wright, 877 N.Y.S.2d 395 (N.Y. App. Div. 2009) (allowing 
forfeiture of all of defendants’ compensation, including by relieving employer of obligation to pay 
defendants’ health, life and dental insurance premiums, after defendants engaged in theft and 
embezzlement); Bon Temps Agency Ltd. v. Greenfield, 445 N.Y.S.2d 981 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992) 
(endorsing compensation forfeiture against manager at placement agency who breached fiduciary and 
contractual duties and observing that “a disloyal employee is not entitled to receive compensation, whether 
commissions or salary”) (citations and internal quotations omitted); Soam Corp. v. Trane Co., 608 
N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (refuting characterization of compensation forfeiture as an 
‘unconscionable penalty’ by observing that New York law “mandates the forfeiture of all compensation, 
whether commissions or salary, where, as here, one who owes a duty of fidelity to a principal is faithless 
in the performance of his services”) (citations omitted). 
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defining the contours of when and how to disgorge compensation from faithless 
employees. 
a. Differing views regarding the amount of harm that an employer 
must suffer in order to trigger disgorgement 
One area in which courts differ in applying disgorgement relates to the 
degree of harm that an employer must suffer before the court will disgorge 
compensation from a breaching fiduciary. Some courts have held that an 
employer need not establish proof of any direct damage or loss arising out of the 
employee’s faithless performance; proof of the employee’s disloyalty alone 
serves as a sufficient bass for the forfeiture of compensation.197 Indeed, in the 
view of some courts, the fact that an employer actually profited from an 
employee’s work during the period of the employee’s disloyalty will not prevent 
or limit the application of disgorgement.198 In Astra, for example, during the 
period of Bildman’s misconduct, the overall profits of the company that Bildman 
oversaw met or exceeded its established goals.199 Yet in allowing the 
disgorgement of Bildman’s compensation, the court observed that the faithless 
servant doctrine requires an employee to forfeit his compensation “even if he 
otherwise performed valuable services for the principal.”200 In the court’s view, 
“[n]or does it make any difference that the services were beneficial to the 
principal, or that the principal suffered no provable damage as a result of the 
breach. . . .”201 
The Enstar court mirrored this analysis, emphatically dismissing the 
employee’s arguments that “his conduct . . . caused very little, if any, actual 
damage to the corporation”202 and that his employer actually had made money 
from the investments that formed the basis of the employee’s breach.203 To the 
contrary, the court deemed irrelevant to its forfeiture analysis any proof 
regarding the damage that the company may or may not have suffered as a result 
of the employee’s breach.204 According to the court, it could no more question 
whether Grassgreen’s conduct had harmed his former employer then it could 
 
 197.  See Van Arsdale, supra note 13, §§ 2, 8; see also Feiger v. Iral Jewelry, Ltd., 363 N.E.2d 350, 
351 (N.Y. 1977) (“Nor does it make any difference that the services were beneficial to the principal, or 
that the principal suffered no provable damage as a result of the breach of fidelity by the agent.”) (citations 
omitted); Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2003); James R. Carroll & 
Jason C. Weida, Faithless Servants Beware: Massachusetts Forfeiture Law is More Severe Than Astra 
USA, Inc. v. Bildman Might Suggest, BOSTON BAR J. 7, 9 (2010). 
 198.  See Feiger, supra note 198, at 351; Phansalkar, supra note 198, at 200. 
 199.  Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 40 (Mass. 2009). 
 200.  Id. at 47. 
 201.  Id. (citations and quotations marks omitted). 
 202.  Enstar Grp., Inc. v. Grassgreen, 812 F. Supp. 1562, 1574 (M.D. Ala. 1993). 
 203.  See id. 
 204.  See id. 
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speculate regarding the benefits that Enstar would have accrued had Grassgreen 
faithfully performed his duties.205 
The court in Kaye v. Rosefielde reached a similar conclusion with respect to 
the lack of any need for an employer to prove damages as a precursor to 
disgorgement.206 In allowing the disgorgement of the employee’s salary in Kaye, 
the court observed, “the remedy of equitable disgorgement is available to a trial 
court even absent a finding that the employer sustained economic loss by virtue 
of the employee’s disloyal conduct.”207 Rather than viewing disgorgement as a 
way of making the employer whole for any economic loss caused by the 
breaching employee, the court seemed to view this remedy as being directed 
more toward altering the behavior of disloyal employees.208 Citing the possible 
deterrent impact of this remedy, the court noted “its availability signals [to] 
agents that some adverse consequences will follow a breach of fiduciary duty.”209 
Other courts, however, adhere to a more limited view, disgorging an 
employee’s compensation only when the employer can establish that the 
employee’s breach actually caused damage to the employer,210 or when an 
employee’s disloyalty is related to his or her job duties.211 In Sanders v. Madison 
Square Garden, L.P., the New York Knickerbockers (“Knicks”) basketball team 
claimed that a former employee who previously held various high-level 
marketing positions had been engaged in tax fraud and/or had been operating an 
outside business during her employment by the Knicks.212 The team subsequently 
sought to use the faithless servant doctrine to disgorge all of the compensation 
that the employee had received during the period in which she allegedly engaged 
in these wrongful activities.213 In denying the team’s motion for leave to amend 
its answer to assert a counterclaim against the employee for breach of fiduciary 
duty, a New York federal district court observed that “neither operating an 
outside business nor unethical conduct unrelated to employment violates the 
faithless servant doctrine unless such business or behavior adversely affects the 
 
 205.  See id. 
 206.  121 A.3d 862, 864–65 (N.J. 2015). 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  See id. at 873. 
 209.  Kaye, 121 A.3d at 873 (citations and internal quotations omitted); see Rubin, supra note 146 
(characterizing the Kaye case as one “that’s bound to scare in-house counsel . . .”). 
 210. See, e.g., Hartford Elevator, Inc. v. Lauer, 289 N.W.2d 280, 287 (Wis. 1980) (holding that 
“whether the agent should be denied all or any part of his compensation . . . depends on consideration and 
evaluation of the relevant circumstances . . . includ[ing] . . . the loss, expenses and inconvenience caused 
to the employer by the employee’s breach . . . .”); Sanders v. Madison Square Garden, L.P., No. 06 Civ. 
589(GEL), 2007 WL 1933933, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. July 2, 2007) (declining to apply Faithless Servant 
Doctrine where employer “conspicuously fails to identify any way in which it suffered any such 
damage . . .”). 
 211.  See Sanders, 2007 WL 1933933, at *7. 
 212.  Id. at *1–2. 
 213.  See id. at *3. Specifically, Sanders had brought a discrimination suit against the Knicks, and 
the Knicks asserted the Faithless Servant Doctrine as part of a counterclaim against Sanders, having 
discovered evidence of her alleged wrongful conduct during discovery related to Sanders’ lawsuit. See id. 
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employee’s job performance.”214 Here, the court observed, the employer had 
failed to present any evidence that Sanders’ alleged misconduct negatively 
impacted her performance.215 Instead, the court explicitly distinguished Sander’s 
misconduct from that which had supported complete disgorgement in 
Phansalkar, finding that—unlike the wrongdoing in Phansalkar—any alleged 
misconduct by Sanders did not “permeate the employee’s service in its most 
material and substantial part.”216 
Even in these more restrictive jurisdictions, however, Weinstein’s conduct 
undoubtedly would satisfy the requirement that an employer establish damages 
from an employee’s breach of fiduciary duties; the Weinstein Company clearly 
suffered tremendous harm as a result of Weinstein’s misbehavior. In fact, one 
need not speculate regarding the potential harm that Weinstein’s conduct caused 
to the Weinstein Company: Within weeks of the initial disclosures regarding his 
behavior, one of the company’s largest creditors, AI International Holdings, 
purportedly demanded an immediate repayment of a $45 million loan that it had 
made to the Weinstein Company, and other parties that traditionally had worked 
with the Weinstein Company—such as Apple and Amazon—distanced 
themselves from the company.217 Within months, this once-multi-million dollar 
company faced financial ruin and a raft of litigation.218 
b. Differing views regarding the amount of compensation that an 
employer can disgorge 
Different jurisdictions also have adopted differing views regarding the 
amount of compensation that an employer can disgorge when faced with 
disloyalty by an employee. Some courts require a faithless servant to forfeit all 
compensation that he or she received once the disloyalty commenced,219 or for 
the entire period during which the employee’s disloyalty occurred.220 Such courts 
 
 214.  Id. at *4 (citations omitted); see id. at *7 (finding Sanders’ alleged misconduct “[was] so far 
removed from [her] job responsibilities that it cannot be said that the misconduct ‘substantially’ interfered 
with her job performance”). 
 215.  Id. at *4. 
 216.  See id. at *5 (citing Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 203 (2nd Cir. 
2003)). Similarly, in Feiger v. Iral Jewelry, the highest New York state court rejected an employer’s effort 
to disgorge commissions from an employee who took initial steps to start a competitive business, noting 
that plaintiff “never lessened his work on behalf of defendant and never misappropriated to his own use 
any business secrets or special knowledge . . . .” 363 N.E.2d 350, 351 (N.Y. 1977) (citations omitted). 
 217.  See Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32. 
 218.  See infra § III.D; supra notes 40–46 and accompanying text; Farrow, supra note 1 (opining that 
“Weinstein’s behavior deeply affected the day-to-day operations of his companies”). 
 219.  See Van Arsdale, supra note 13, §§ 2, 12; cf. Astra USA, Inc., v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 47–
48 (Mass. 2009) (citing without endorsement cases articulating rule that “disloyal employees and agents 
forfeit all compensation ever received from the employer”) (citations omitted). 
 220.  See Carroll & Weida, supra note 197, at 9 (citing cases that confirm a court’s discretion to 
impose “total forfeiture during the period of breach”) (citations omitted); Warren, supra note 142, at 1142 
(observing that a majority of jurisdictions apply a “bright line rule that the agent must forfeit all 
compensation paid or payable over the entire period of the agent’s disloyalty . . .”); Astra, 914 N.E.2d at 
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generally will not permit an employee to offset against the disgorged 
compensation the value of any benefits that might have flowed from the 
employee’s work during the relevant period.221 In Astra, as noted above, the court 
deemed it appropriate to disgorge all of the compensation that Bildman earned 
during the five-year period of his disloyalty—1991 through 1996—despite 
evidence that Bildman successfully had performed his job duties during this 
period, generating profits for his employer.222 The Second Circuit reached a 
similar conclusion in Phansalkar, finding that the employer could disgorge all 
compensation earned by the disloyal employee during the period of the 
disloyalty, and expressly declining to limit disgorgement only to compensation 
for the specific tasks with respect to which the employee was disloyal.223 
In Enstar, the Alabama federal court echoed this view, expressly rejecting 
Grassgreen’s assertion that “it would not be equitable to require a total forfeiture 
of compensation because, regardless of what he may have done wrong, he 
worked diligently on behalf of the corporation and the corporation profited from 
his work.”224 Noting a desire to enforce corporate officers’ and directors’ duty of 
loyalty “as forcefully as possible,”225 the court disgorged “all salary, bonuses and 
other compensation that were paid to [Grassgreen] by his corporation while he 
was in breach of his duties”226—an amount totaling almost $5.5 million.227 
Moreover, the Enstar court reached this conclusion while also acknowledging 
the almost $2 million compensatory damages award already levied against 
Grassgreen, and while remitting the jury’s $18 million punitive damages award 
to a still-substantial $10 million.228 In other words, the court did not seem to view 
the forfeiture of Grassgreen’s salary and benefits as compensation for the 
employer, nor as “punishment” duplicative of the substantial punitive damages 
in this case. Rather, the court seemed to see this disgorgement as grounded in 
basic fairness and equity, citing with approval authority that characterized salary 
forfeiture following a breach as “required because the agent’s services are not 
being ‘properly’ performed.”229 In other words, Grassgreen never truly “earned” 
 
48 (noting New York Appellate Division decisions that “generally have limited the period of forfeiture to 
the period of the employee’s disloyalty”) (citations omitted). 
 221.  See Warren, supra note 142, at 1142 (citations omitted); id. at 1136–37 (describing faithless 
servant doctrine as requiring an agent who breaches fiduciary duties to “forfeit any compensation for 
services rendered during the period of his breach even though part of those services may have been 
properly performed”) (citation omitted). 
 222.  914 N.E.2d at 50-51; see also id. at 40. 
 223.  Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184, 206–08 (2nd Cir. 2003); see id. at 208 
(stating that “forfeiture cannot appropriately be limited to only some transactions in these circumstances, 
where the agreement calls for general compensation, and does not limit compensation to specific amounts 
paid for the completion of specific tasks”). 
 224.  Enstar Grp., Inc. v. Grassgreen, 812 F. Supp. 1562, 1573 (M.D. Ala. 1993). 
 225.  Id. at 1574. 
 226.  Id. at 1575. 
 227.  Id. 
 228.  Id. at 1581–82. 
 229.  Id. at 1574 (citations and quotation marks omitted). 
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his compensation during the period of disloyalty and thus lacked any entitlement 
to such compensation. 
For each of these courts, the justification for this total disgorgement seems 
to stem from a belief that such significant wrongdoing in one aspect of an 
employee’s performance taints all other aspects of his or her employment—even 
those where the employee performed profitably for the employer.230 In this 
respect, disgorgement—as a restitutionary remedy—differs significantly from 
compensatory damages: While compensatory damages would focus primarily 
upon the specific losses experienced by the employer,231 disgorgement “was not 
developed to simply compensate the injured beneficiary for its losses, but to 
provide recovery for all ill-gotten gains of the breaching fiduciary as well as his 
salary and other compensation after the breach.”232 
Of course, not every court applying forfeiture principles agrees with this 
broad application of these doctrines. Instead, some courts take a more temperate 
view regarding the amount of compensation to disgorge, limiting forfeiture only 
to the compensation associated with those tasks that actually were performed in 
a disloyal manner.233 In such jurisdictions, the court may apportion the forfeiture 
of compensation and require disgorgement only as to salary or commissions with 
respect to which it finds disloyalty.234 In Sequa Corp. v. GBJ Corp., for example, 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals cited a “possible relaxation of New York’s 
strict rule demanding forfeiture of all of a faithless servant’s compensation . . . 
in favor of a rule of apportionment under which only the fees related to the 
‘specified items of work’ as to which the agent acted faithlessly would be 
forfeited.”235 Sequa, however, predates by several years the Second Circuit’s 
more recent decision in Phansalkar, which allowed the complete disgorgement 
of a breaching fiduciary’s compensation (with the cases decided in 1998 and 
2003, respectively).236 Thus, while some courts may appear to apply a more 
 
 230.  See Warren, supra note 142, at 1142 (tracing rule imposing total disgorgement for period of 
breach to idea that “the agent’s misconduct tainted or otherwise permeated his entire relationship with his 
principal from the original point of breach going forward”). 
 231.  See, e.g., Dobbs, supra note 14, § 3.1. 
 232.  Warren, supra note 142, at 1137. 
 233.  See Van Arsdale, supra note 13, §§ 2, 13 (citations omitted). 
 234.  See id. § 13 (citations omitted). 
 235.  156 F.3d 136, 147 (2nd Cir. 1998) (citation omitted); see also Kaye v. Rosefielde, 121 A.3d 
862, 874 (N.J. 2015) (noting that in applying factors to determine extent of disgorgement, a court need 
not disgorge the entirety of a wrongdoer’s compensation, but rather may apportion disgorgement to the 
extent appropriate); Schneider v. Wein & Malkin LLP, 2004 WL 2495843, at *18–19 (N.Y. App. Div. 
Nov. 1, 2004) (citations omitted) (discussing various factors to apply in determining amount of 
compensation to disgorge); cf. Richard F. Albert, Punishment Without Cause: Disgorgement and 
Forfeiture of Salary and Pensions, FORBES (Apr. 2, 2014), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/insider/2014/04/02/punishment-without-cause-disgorgement-and-
forfeiture-of-salary-and-pensions/ [https://perma.cc/Y3Y8-6KTK] (discussing ruling in recent SEC 
enforcement action confirming that “disgorgement under the federal securities laws reaches only so much 
of a defendant’s gains as are shown to be causally related to the fraud”). 
 236.  Compare Sequa, 156 F.3d, with Phansalkar v. Andersen Weinroth & Co., 344 F.3d 184 (2nd 
Cir. 2003). 
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moderate version of the faithless servant doctrine to reach only compensation 
directly tied to acts of disloyalty,237 other courts still seem to adhere to the harsher 
version of this doctrine.238 
Once again, while these jurisdictional differences may matter in many 
cases, as applied to Weinstein, their significance fades. Even if Weinstein were 
sued in a more restrictive jurisdiction that limited disgorgement only to the 
compensation associated with tasks that actually were performed disloyally, as 
discussed above, Weinstein’s disloyalty seemed to permeate every aspect of his 
working life, from the way that he interacted with actresses to his use of 
underlings to cover up his misconduct to his persuading of the board to use 
company funds to pay off victims who dared to complain.239 One might argue 
that there was no aspect of Weinstein’s working life that was cleansed of this 
misconduct. Accordingly, even in a jurisdiction that requires a close connection 
between any funds disgorged and any acts of misconduct, a plaintiff likely still 
would be able to reach most (if not all) of Weinstein’s compensation. 
C. Hitting Harvey Where it Hurts: Harvey Weinstein as a Faithless 
Servant 
Examining this compensation forfeiture jurisprudence in light of the 
circumstances associated with the Weinstein controversy, one might wonder 
about the potential applicability of disgorgement to Weinstein. On the most 
obvious level, the factual parallels between the Weinstein matter and Astra are 
striking: Just as Bildman “used Astra as his personal checkbook and sexual 
fiefdom, in the process driving away employees, creating a corrosive corporate 
atmosphere, causing Astra actual loss, and leading to months of bad publicity 
about the company,”240 Weinstein likewise is alleged to have used the company 
as his sexual playground and to have strong-armed other workers into 
participating in his immoral and illegal behavior, all while enforcing a strict code 
of silence among everyone involved.241 More broadly, Weinstein’s conduct 
arguably reflects the sort of fiduciary breach with respect to which courts have 
 
 237.  While these jurisdictions potentially employ a more lenient application of the faithless servant 
doctrine and other forfeiture tools, courts in at least one such jurisdiction place the burden on the disloyal 
employee to establish the “value” of any services provided to the employer. See Carroll & Weida, supra 
note 197, at 9. 
 238.  See, e.g., Phansalkar, 344 F.3d at 208 (“Phansalkar is required to forfeit all compensation 
awarded to him after . . . the date upon which his disloyalty began.”). Notably, the Restatement of 
Employment Law echoes the more modest approach, allowing an employer to disgorge the compensation 
paid to an employee who has breached his or her fiduciary duties only when “the employee’s 
compensation cannot be apportioned between the employee’s disloyal services and the employee’s loyal 
services; and . . . the nature of the employee’s disloyalty is such that there is no practicable method for 
making a reasonable calculation of the harm caused the employer by the employee’s disloyal services.” 
RESTATEMENT OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 9.09(c) (AM. LAW. INST. 2019) 
 239.  See supra notes 29–35 and accompanying text. 
 240.  Astra USA, Inc. v. Bildman, 914 N.E.2d 36, 51, n. 30 (Mass. 2009). 
 241.  See generally Farrow, supra note 1; Kantor & Twohey, supra note 1; Faughnder et al., supra 
note 33; Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32. 
320 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW Vol. 41:2 
ordered compensation forfeiture: While not a breach involving a more 
prototypical wrong like embezzlement or usurping corporate clients, 
“[p]resumably it counts as bad faith if a co-chairman were to use his position of 
power at the company to harass and sexually assault potential and actual 
employees while at the same time endangering the firm’s reputation.”242 Thus, 
Weinstein’s conduct might well be seen as forming the underlying basis for a 
breach of fiduciary duty claim necessary to trigger a forfeiture remedy.243 
Applying the faithless servant doctrine to sexual misconduct like 
Weinstein’s also dovetails with much of the research regarding the best ways for 
changing workplace culture.244 First, disgorging compensation from a company’s 
fiduciaries unquestionably models a “serious, sober approach” to addressing 
workplace harassment,245 since most individuals would view the loss of some or 
all of their compensation as a grave indication of wrongdoing. Unlike empty 
statements of regret or consternation that may be issued by a company or its 
board, requiring the forfeiture of compensation paid to a disloyal worker 
demonstrates how seriously a company takes such wrongdoing. Similarly, such 
a loss of compensation undoubtedly constitutes a “concrete negative 
ramification” for this individual’s misbehavior.246 Indeed, in Weinstein’s case, 
an application of the faithless servant doctrine would lead to the disgorgement of 
millions of dollars, particularly if the court took into account such benefits as 
Weinstein’s lush travel budget and backend revenue deals on his films.247 This 
seems particularly important where, as noted above, Weinstein may not 
otherwise personally experience direct financial consequences for his 
wrongdoing, given that the bulk of the civil claims against him seem likely to 
settle and will likely be covered in full by the Weinstein Company’s insurance 
providers.248 Finally, in its own way, applying disgorgement principles to these 
situations could “alter[] the power structure” within the organization as a 
whole,249 not necessarily by increasing the representation of women within the 
organization, but perhaps by stripping power (financial power, at least) from 
those whose conduct warrants such a relegation. If there is any truth to the mantra 
that “money is power,” then using the faithless servant doctrine to disgorge funds 
from powerful harassers like Weinstein could at a minimum shake up the 
hierarchy within the organization. 
Even when applying the specific criteria for disgorgement set forth in Kaye 
v. Rosefielde, forfeiture of at least some of Weinstein’s compensation seems to 
 
 242.  Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32 (quotation marks omitted). 
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 244.  See supra § II.B. 
 245.  See supra § II.B.1. 
 246.  See supra § II.B.2. 
 247.  See supra notes 47, 50–51 and accompanying text; infra § III.D. 
 248.  See supra note 52 and accompanying text. 
 249.  See supra § II.B.3. 
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be a possible remedy.250 First, the Kaye court listed “the employee’s degree of 
responsibility and level of compensation.”251 As one of the founders and co-
chairmen of the Weinstein Company,252 Harvey Weinstein enjoyed virtually 
limitless power within the organization, and his compensation of over 
$3,000,000 per year almost certainly dwarfed that of most (if not all) other 
individuals in the organization.253 Second, the Kaye court identified as a factor 
“the number of acts of disloyalty.”254 Weinstein’s disloyalty infused virtually all 
that he did, encompassing his interactions with a vast array of players across the 
entertainment industry, from mega-stars to unknown interns.255 Indeed, with 
dozens of women already having publicly come forward to accuse Weinstein of 
assault, harassment, and rape (among other charges),256 and perhaps countless 
others who have not yet come forward or been identified publicly,257 a court 
readily could assume that Weinstein engaged in numerous acts of disloyalty. 
The Kaye court further identified “the extent to which those acts placed the 
employer’s business in jeopardy” as a criterion to consider when contemplating 
forfeiture.258 Once again, this factor weighs heavily in favor of disgorging 
Weinstein’s compensation. While one could argue that, in the short term, 
Weinstein’s behavior might have created advantages for his companies in the 
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form of greater power and influence,259 the end result of his behavior 
unquestionably hurt the company—bringing terrible publicity and ultimately 
financial ruin.260 As discussed previously, within weeks of the scandal becoming 
public, one of the company’s largest creditors purportedly demanded an 
immediate repayment of a $45 million loan that it had made to the Weinstein 
Company,261 and other longstanding corporate partners immediately distanced 
themselves from the company.262 
Finally, the Kaye court cited “the degree of planning to undermine the 
employer that is undertaken by the employee” as a factor in determining whether 
disgorgement is appropriate.263 Countless witnesses have made clear that 
Weinstein’s indiscretions were not isolated instances of spontaneous poor 
judgment, but rather involved great degrees of premeditation.264 Weinstein 
repeatedly deputized countless others within the Weinstein Company to facilitate 
his sexual misconduct.265 In addition, Weinstein himself appears to have engaged 
in a concerted attempt to cover up his illegal behavior, working with his lawyers 
and public relations team to “conduct[] a decades-long campaign to suppress 
these stories.”266 
Looking even more broadly at the philosophical underpinnings of 
compensation disgorgement, Weinstein’s conduct falls squarely within the 
remedial goals of this doctrine. Compensation disgorgement (whether in the 
form of the faithless servant doctrine or operating under another label) is an 
equitable, restitutionary remedy.267 As already noted, restitution differs from the 
legal remedy of damages in that, while damages aim to lessen or eliminate the 
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harm that a plaintiff has suffered,268 restitution focuses on disgorging a 
defendant’s wrongful gain.269 Thus, a court considering whether to apply 
disgorgement to Harvey Weinstein would not focus upon the extent to which the 
plaintiff (presumably, Weinstein’s former employer, the Weinstein Company) 
may have suffered due to Weinstein’s misconduct; rather, the court’s attention 
would remain upon how Weinstein himself might wrongfully have gained from 
his misbehavior.270 
Weinstein likely profited in a variety of ways from his behavior. 
Weinstein’s power within the entertainment industry (before his fall, of course) 
was undisputed, with individuals who worked in all aspects of the business 
feeling compelled to kowtow to him in meetings, on movie sets, and even from 
the awards show stage.271 Yet while Weinstein’s power enabled his sexual 
exploits,272 his sexual exploits also seemed to make him more powerful, giving 
him greater control over the careers of the women who complied—or not—with 
his overtures.273 In this way, the sexual power that Weinstein wrongfully asserted 
over his victims ultimately may have translated into his power within Hollywood 
more generally, in a sort of vicious cycle: While Weinstein’s control within the 
industry functioned to silence his victims who feared retaliation if they spoke out 
against him,274 the aura of omnipotence and untouchable-ness that such silence 
created fostered the notion that Weinstein was to be worshipped, acceded to, and 
protected from reproach—a mentality that could not help but enhance his 
professional ability to dictate the who, when, and how of celebrity appearances 
in his films. He burnished his own star by proving that he quite literally could do 
whatever he wanted, to whomever he wanted, inevitably giving him greater 
power within the industry overall. 
Weinstein’s harsh mistreatment of those around him also may have 
bolstered his power on a more basic level, with the success of Weinstein’s 
movies perhaps being more inextricably tied to his misbehavior. As at least one 
observer has noted, Weinstein and his brother Bob became known for their 
“alchemical skill at attracting top talent, squeezing maximum profit out of genre 
schlock, and reliably conjuring awards-season gold—seemingly on strength of 
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the brothers’ brash personalities alone.”275 Perhaps Weinstein’s need to harass 
and intimidate became such a part of his modus operandi that, had he suddenly 
and magically morphed into a kind and gentle Beta-male, his very brand (and his 
ability to execute upon that brand) would have suffered.276 Thus, while Weinstein 
may not have “benefitted” from his sexual misconduct as directly or concretely 
as the executive who absconds with his employer’s clients or the employee who 
embezzles his employer’s funds, Weinstein did arguably gain—both personally 
and professionally—from his harassing behavior. 
As conventional tools for addressing sexual harassment at work have 
proven fairly ineffective in combating this misbehavior, perhaps the more novel 
faithless servant doctrine and other compensation forfeiture tools can serve as a 
more successful way to alter the workplace culture. Moving beyond mere 
compensatory damages to apply compensation disgorgement to a wrongdoer like 
Weinstein might represent a more powerful approach, going beyond simply 
making a plaintiff whole with respect to the wrongs involved in a particular 
situation and instead deterring misbehavior in a broader manner by making that 
misbehavior unprofitable for the wrongdoer.277 Even in those jurisdictions that 
apply the faithless servant doctrine in its most limited form by requiring proof of 
harm to the employer and/or some connection between the employee’s wrongful 
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conduct and his or her job duties,278 much workplace sexual harassment likely 
will satisfy this requirement—particularly when practiced at a scale such as that 
shown by Harvey Weinstein. Where policies and training and temperate 
guidance all fail to discourage sexual harassment in the workplace, the best 
solution may be to hit bad actors where it hurts — in their pocketbooks. 
D. But Who Gets Weinstein’s Salary? When the Faithless Servant 
Works for a Culpable Master 
In most (if not all) of the cases discussed above, requiring a breaching 
fiduciary to forfeit his or her compensation would seem to achieve equitable 
results due to the fiduciary’s failure properly to serve his or her innocent master. 
Courts may take a different view, however, where the master/employer does not 
inhabit such an innocent role, but rather shares some culpability with the 
breaching employee. How can a court permit an employer to reap the financial 
benefits of recouping some or all of an employee’s compensation when the 
employer itself countenanced —and perhaps even joined in—the conduct 
forming the basis of the fiduciary’s breach? A court contemplating whether to 
apply forfeiture principles to Harvey Weinstein’s compensation might well 
confront precisely this predicament. 
In the weeks and months after the Weinstein story broke, various questions 
arose regarding what involvement, if any, the Weinstein Company had in Harvey 
Weinstein’s misconduct. The Weinstein Company Board of Directors initially 
denied any knowledge regarding Weinstein’s misconduct, claiming to be 
“shocked and dismayed” by these revelations279 and asserting that the charges 
“came as ‘an utter surprise’ to [the Board].”280 However, many outsiders remain 
skeptical about this alleged lack of awareness, pointing to settlement agreements 
which were reported to the Board and which would have been part of the metric 
considered in renewing Weinstein’s most recent contract in 2015.281 In fact, 
Weinstein is purported to have settled harassment claims with at least eight 
women during a roughly thirty-year period282—settlements that presumably 
would be disclosed to the Board of Directors.283 This has led an attorney for one 
accuser to argue that “executives must have long been on notice of [Weinstein’s] 
behavior, based on the decades-long history of allegations and confidential 
settlements now being made public.”284 
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The New York Times article that exposed Weinstein’s misconduct reinforces 
this view, asserting that as early as 2015, several Weinstein Company board 
members (including Harvey Weinstein’s brother and longtime business partner, 
Bob) were alarmed about the allegations of harassment against Weinstein, but 
ultimately “were assured there was no reason to investigate.”285 Moreover, 
Weinstein’s most recent contract is purported to have explicitly addressed the 
potential for future claims of misconduct against Weinstein, requiring Weinstein 
to reimburse the Weinstein Company for any settlements or judgments arising 
out of his misconduct and mandating additional payments to the Weinstein 
Company for each instance of misconduct.286 Based on such evidence, at least 
one scholar has suggested that the Weinstein Company’s Board of Directors itself 
might be liable for breaching its fiduciary duty to investors for “exposing the 
company to unreasonable financial risk, whether negligently or knowingly.”287 
Thus, while various claims against the Weinstein Company and officers were 
dismissed in April 2019,288 many still believe that the company at best ignored 
the multitude of obvious danger signs, and at worst actively facilitated the 
misbehavior and its subsequent cover-up.289 
Further adding to the possibility that the company itself might share 
responsibility for Weinstein’s actions is the tremendous gain that the Weinstein 
Company accrued, at least indirectly, from Weinstein’s misbehavior. As 
previously discussed, Weinstein’s bullying and harassing conduct not only 
victimized female actresses and others in the entertainment industry; it also gave 
Weinstein greater power within the business, thus aiding him in his quest to 
dominate the industry, secure the work of any actress that he desired, and control 
how such actresses operated both on and off the set.290 While such power-
hoarding benefitted Weinstein personally in various ways (sexual and 
otherwise),291 it undoubtedly garnered substantial benefits for the Weinstein 
Company as well, in the form of more successful movies with bigger stars and 
greater market dominance.292 While much public attention has been focused on 
the dire financial consequences for the Weinstein Company in the wake of the 
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scandal, for years the Weinstein Company flourished as at least an indirect result 
of Harvey Weinstein’s misbehavior. 
Concerns therefore may arise in applying traditional compensation 
forfeiture principles to Harvey Weinstein, in that such disgorgement would allow 
a possibly culpable master (the Weinstein Company) to reap significant financial 
benefits from its servant’s misbehavior. Accordingly, a more sensible application 
of forfeiture to this matter might allow shareholders—or, perhaps, even victims 
of Weinstein’s misconduct—to receive any compensation that ultimately is 
disgorged from Weinstein. Reaching such a legal result presents various 
difficulties, however. For example, it is unclear how any such legal action might 
be initiated. While a company’s board of directors may bring a breach of 
fiduciary duty claim against a disloyal officer,293 to date, no board member has 
brought such an action against Weinstein, and no board member has indicated a 
likelihood of doing so. Indeed, with many of the claims against Weinstein and 
the Weinstein Company now having either been dismissed or tentatively settled, 
likely at the Weinstein Company’s insurance carriers’ expense,294 there seems to 
be little incentive for any board member to sue. 
In the absence of a traditional breach of fiduciary duty claim, shareholders 
could pursue a “derivative action”—a lawsuit brought by shareholders on behalf 
of the company.295 Essentially, shareholders would stand in the shoes of the 
Weinstein Company Board to seek compensation from Weinstein on behalf of 
the company. Such derivative lawsuits impose a high standard on plaintiffs, 
however: A plaintiff first must demand that the corporation itself bring suit, 
something that seems unlikely to happen.296 Moreover, if the corporation refuses 
such a demand, the plaintiff must prove that the corporate directors could not 
have exercised “independent and disinterested business judgment” in their 
decision not to sue.297 In applying this “business judgment rule” to a 
corporation’s decision not to sue, courts have made clear that “the board of 
directors is presumed to be disinterested and to have acted on an informed basis, 
in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best 
interests of the corporation.”298 Accordingly, a board’s decisions—including the 
decision not to sue—”will not be disturbed by a court if [it] can be attributed to 
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any rational business purpose.”299 Thus, so long as the Weinstein Company 
Board could demonstrate that its decision not to pursue legal action against 
Weinstein stemmed from any rational business reason, a shareholder derivative 
action against the Weinstein Company would seem unlikely to succeed. 
In some instances, however, courts have excused plaintiffs from complying 
with this demand requirement if the plaintiff can show that such a demand would 
be “futile”—for example, by showing that directors would not be willing to act 
on a demand because of a conflict of interest or because the board itself bears 
some liability for the wrong in question.300 Such circumstances sometimes give 
rise to Caremark claims (named after a 1996 case involving allegations of fraud 
at a company bearing the same name).301 In Caremark claims, investors assert 
that the directors of a company breached their fiduciary duties by causing or 
permitting the company to break the law, or by failing to oversee a monitoring 
system that would ensure the company’s compliance with the law.302 In other 
words, Caremark claims place liability on the board itself for failing to act in the 
face of “red flags” that “would make a reasonable person— who has the duty to 
advance the best interests of the company—take action and avoid further harm 
to the company. . . .”303 In the context of the Weinstein Company, shareholders 
would allege that board members of the Weinstein Company breached their 
fiduciary duties by failing to properly monitor Weinstein, and that board 
members’ own potential liability now prevents them from exercising 
“independent and disinterested judgment” in deciding whether to sue Weinstein 
themselves.304 
Given the anecdotal evidence regarding the Weinstein Company Board’s 
awareness of and failure to respond to Weinstein’s ongoing misdeeds,305 a 
Caremark claim at first blush seems to represent a plausible approach. Caremark 
claims, however, also present significant hurdles for potential plaintiffs; only a 
showing of “sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight—
such as an utter failure to attempt to assure a reasonable information and 
reporting system exists—will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary 
condition to liability.”306 Delaware courts interpreting Caremark have held that 
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this high standard may be met when “red flags . . . are either waved in one’s face 
or displayed so that they are visible to the careful observer.”307 Perhaps Harvey 
Weinstein’s three decades of workplace sexual misconduct—misconduct so 
blatant that it became the entertainment industry’s worst kept secret308—might 
meet this high standard, thus allowing this claim to serve as a vehicle for 
investors to get relief. 
Corporate law experts can debate the best vehicle for finding liability 
against Weinstein and/or the Weinstein Company Board, based upon their 
collective misconduct. The more intriguing question, however, remains whether 
the proper remedy for any such claim might involve applying the faithless servant 
doctrine or a similar compensation forfeiture tool to disgorge Weinstein’s 
compensation during the period in which he breached his fiduciary duties —and 
presumably to do so in a way that ensures that the Weinstein Company itself does 
not reap the financial benefits of such disgorgement. Should disgorgement 
principles be applied to Weinstein’s compensation, any funds collected should 
be directed to the shareholders whose economic interest in the company has been 
decimated, or perhaps to Weinstein’s victims whose lives were negatively 
impacted by his misconduct.309 Applying compensation disgorgement to 
predators like Harvey Weinstein provides companies with a powerful tool not 
only to demonstrate that egregious sexual misconduct negates any value that the 
misbehaving employee otherwise brought to the company, but also to 
communicate to their employees and to the public at large that their workplace 
culture will not tolerate such misbehavior. 
CONCLUSION 
More than three decades after the U.S. Supreme Court first deemed 
workplace sexual harassment unlawful under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964,310 employers, employees, academics and members of the public continue 
to puzzle over how to stem this tide of inappropriate sexual misconduct at work. 
 
 307.  Hemel & Lund I, supra note 32 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
 308.  See supra notes 281–90 and accompanying text. 
 309.  One possible idea might involve creating a trust to hold the disgorged funds for the benefit of 
Weinstein’s victims. See Investor Bulletin: How Victims of Securities Law Violations May Recover 
Money, U.S. SECS. & EXCH. COMM’N (June 21, 2018), https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-
bulletins/ib_recovermoney.html [https://perma.cc/966N-HEL6]. While such an idea is intriguing, it 
presents multiple difficulties, the resolution of which fall outside the scope of this paper. For example, 
should all victims of Weinstein’s inappropriate conduct benefit from this fund, from those who “merely” 
endured tasteless comments from Weinstein to those who suffered from physical assaults and/or rapes? 
Must an individual serve as a named plaintiff and/or as part of a class action against Weinstein in order to 
collect from such a fund? What level of proof must one show in order to collect? Do all victims collect 
equal shares from such a fund, or should an administrator parcel out funds according to the degree of 
harm? Cf. Jill S. Chanen & Margaret G. Tebo, Accounting for Lives: The 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund 
Worked. But What About Next Time?, ABA J. (Sept. 2007) (discussing complicated method employed by 
Special Master Kenneth Feinberg in individualizing awards from 9/11 Victim Compensation fund). 
 310.  See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). 
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The faithless servant doctrine and comparable compensation forfeiture tools 
represent one possible solution to this problem. 
Research shows that reducing sexual harassment in a workplace requires 
more than just training, education, and pleas for good behavior. Instead, 
employers must find a way to alter the broader culture in the workplace. 
Employees must come to see sexual harassment as a substantial wrong—one that 
is simply not tolerated by their employer. Disgorging a wrongdoer’s salary 
conveys this type of significant statement, not only to the employee whose 
compensation is disgorged, but also to the broader employee population. Perhaps 
this is why the Employment Law Alliance—one of the world’s largest networks 
of labor and employment lawyers311— described the faithless servant doctrine as 
a “‘hulk’-like superhero,”312 one that “serves up justice with ‘smashing’ deterrent 
impact.”313 The court in Astra likewise emphasized the importance of the 
deterrent impact of this doctrine, observing that while “New York’s forfeiture 
law has been described as harsh . . . , the harshness of the remedy is precisely the 
point.”314 Engaging in the compensation forfeiture contemplated by the faithless 
servant doctrine and similar mechanisms conveys a clear message to workers 
regarding what type of behavior simply will not be tolerated in the workplace. 
There likely is no perfect tool for entirely eliminating sexual harassment at 
work. Dynamics of power and gender will continue to shape how employees 
interact with one another, leading some to behave in a manner that includes 
egregious and potentially unlawful sexual conduct or advances. While neither 
the faithless servant doctrine nor other compensation forfeiture tools represent 
the magic bullet, they do represent a new possible approach—one that might 
make headway in this longstanding and vexing problem, if applied in a way that 
properly addresses potential employer misconduct as well. 
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